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BANK ON WE THE PEOPLE: WHY AND HOW 




Biobanks emerged in the early 2000s, and now facilitate scientific 
research through the provision of resources for research that requires 
a large scale of biospecimens and data. Biobank projects have also 
become intertwined with complicated socio-economic initiatives to 
boost economic development or to shape community identity. While 
legislators continue to debate the ethical and regulatory challenges 
associated with biobanks, the federal regulation over research 
involving human subjects, the Common Rule, is based on a traditional 
research model that fails to address the complex challenges unique to 
biobanking. Through an examination of the proposed revisions to the 
Common Rule concerning research using biospecimens and ethical 
controversies regarding informed consent, privacy, ownership and 
benefit-sharing, this article highlights a participatory aspect of 
biobanking that calls for public engagement with respect to both ethics 
and norms. Many biobank projects try to appeal to a sense of civic 
engagement whereby citizens have rights as well as responsibilities 
with respect to participation in collaborative scientific projects.
Domestic and international guidelines describe incorporating public 
engagement with biobanking as an essential means of protecting 
research participants and achieving good governance. International 
experiences with various approaches of public engagement have also 
proven that involving the general public is feasible. Moreover, the 
principle of democratic deliberation, which was proposed by the 
Presidential Commission for the Studies of Bioethical Issues to be a 
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guiding principle for bioethics policy decisions, further underscores 
the criticality of public engagement in biobanking.
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I. Introduction: Biobanks and We the People
After the completion of the Human Genome Project in the early 2000s, 
numerous biobanks were established globally. A biobank is an organized 
collection of human biological material, DNA, genetic samples, and associ-
ated data. Biobanks, especially large-scale ones, are usually considered to 
be valuable pieces of infrastructure that can enable research in the fields of 
medicine and biotechnology, and the consequent scientific developments 
made therefrom could confer benefits on the entire community. The launch 
of many large-scale biobanks was also motivated by a sense of nation-
building because biobanks can preserve natural resources that can boost a 
country’s bioeconomy1 or serve as the commons for exploring a nation’s
identity and serve a nation’s health and welfare.2 The biobank bubble that 
inflated over the past 20 years has not yet burst. According to a market sur-
vey in 2018, the global market of biobanking was estimated to reach 74.54 
billion USD by 2025 at a 4.5% compound annual growth rate3, despite the 
withdrawal of funding in a few countries.4 In light of technological devel-
opments with respect to storage and computation and the emergence of new 
research methods such as genomic and big data, researchers using biobanks 
have begun to integrate information from other databases as well. These re-
search approaches highlight the value of biobanks: biobanks allow research-
ers to use accumulations of data and link these banked biospecimens with 
health data.
While some biobanks gained public support because of their national-
istic aspects, growing international cooperation has diluted the nationalistic 
aspect of biobanks. However, the success of biobanks depends on public 
support and investment. Because these biobanks cannot operate without 
maintaining a broad set of samples and data, they require continuous contri-
bution from the general public; however, people have become more con-
cerned about maintaining autonomy and ownership of their own data and 
tissues. Additionally, the growing budgets necessary to sustain biobanks 
have increased the importance of establishing transparency, accountability, 
and public trust with respect to biobanking. Biobank projects today appeal 
not only to people’s desires to make altruistic contributions to the advance-
1. Robert Mitchell, National Biobanks: Clinical Labor, Risk Production, and the Cre-
ation of Biovalue, 35 SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES 330, 333 (2010).
2. See HERBERT GOTTWEIS & ALAN PETERSEN, Biobanks and Governance: An Intro-
duction, in BIOBANKS: GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3, 7, 10 (Gottweis & 
Petersen eds., 2008).
3. Biobanks Market Size Worth $74.54 Billion by 2025, CAGR 4.5%, GRAND VIEW 
RES. (Sept. 2018), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-biobanks-
industry.
4. Don Chalmers et al., Has the Biobank Bubble Burst? Withstanding the Challenges 
for Sustainable Biobanking in the Digital Era, 17 BMC MEDICAL ETHICS, 2016, at 1, 2, 
https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12910-016-0124-2.
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ment of medicine and public health but also to their sense of civic responsi-
bility. For instance, the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI), launched in 
2016, aims to understand diseases and develop preventive measures and 
treatments by accounting for individual biological, behavioral, and envi-
ronmental differences.5 An essential project of the PMI, named All of Us, is 
operated by the National Institute of Health (NIH) and seeks to assemble a 
cohort of one million persons or more to create a large-scale biobank com-
prising biospecimens and databases containing various health data collected 
from the participants.6 PMI highlights the concept of “participants as part-
ners,”7 which describes how people are empowered to have more active 
roles rather than simply serving as voluntary subjects in need of protection. 
The All of Us project and PMI’s mission statement suggest that citizens 
have the right to access these resources and the right to determine how such 
resources are utilized insofar as they are involved in governance once they 
opt in; simultaneously, however, citizens also share a moral responsibility to 
donate their biospecimens and data for the public good. Scholars have pro-
posed similar ideas about the relationship between civic engagement and 
opting in to such large-scale scientific cohorts, referring to the relationship 
as “genomic citizenship”8 or “data citizenship.”9 Scientific citizenship main-
ly describes how people have rights and responsibilities with respect to par-
ticipation in sharing projects undertaken for scientific research, and people 
should thus have the right to participate in the collective decision-making 
process beyond just exercising individual rights.
Biobanks have presented a novel challenge to regulatory frameworks 
that have been designed to address the ethical issues with respect to the use 
of human research subjects; however, using banked biospecimens and data 
are not necessarily within the scope of human subjects research if the bio-
specimens and data have been de-identified. Moreover, given that biobanks 
are designed to facilitate general future research, voluntary participation is 
usually confirmed through broad consent; however, broad consent is ethical-
ly questionable because participants have the ability to exercise very limited 
real control over biospecimens and data. Interlinking of biobanks and other 
data may lead to breakthroughs in medicine but may also create the poten-
tial for unprecedented endangerment of autonomy and privacy. Despite ef-
5. About the All of Us Research Program, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
https://allofus.nih.gov/about/about-all-us-research-program (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
6. Id.
7. PMI WORKING GROUP, THE PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE COHORT 
PROGRAM—BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21ST CENTURY MEDICINE 39 (Sept. 17, 
2015), https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working-
group-report-20150917-2.pdf.
8. Maya Sabatello & Paul S. Appelbaum, Rising Genomic Citizens: Adolescents and 
the Return of Secondary Genomic Findings, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292, 293-94 (2016).
9. Barbara J. Evans, Power to the People: Data Citizens in the Age of Precision Medi-
cine, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 243, 243 (2016).
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forts to establish ethical and legal regimes for biobanks both domestically 
and internationally, the aforementioned ethical issues remain to be settled. 
Further, because of the considerable number of participants and financial 
investment that biobanks require, their creation and maintenance also face 
issues of democratic legitimacy and accountability.
In response to these challenges, many biobank projects made a partici-
patory turn. Public engagement has become a common practice for biobank 
operators, and an increasing number of calls have been made for biobanks 
to engage in a dynamic, continuing relationship with participants through 
the use of information technologies. The participatory turn resonates with 
the idea of scientific citizenship, which describes the perspective of many 
large-scale biobanks today that assume citizens have rights as well as re-
sponsibilities with respect to participation in communal efforts to achieve 
public interests. However, the participatory turn was not addressed in the 
Belmont Report or the four key bioethical principles.10 Bioethics emphasiz-
es individual autonomy, but has seldom addressed citizen participation in 
governance or in community decision-making. In the context of biobanking, 
“We the People” are not just research subjects but are possessors of ge-
nomic sovereignty on the basis of which we define justice, domestic tran-
quility, general welfare, the blessings of liberty, and obligations to posterity. 
Public engagement, as an approach to realizing popular sovereignty, is cru-
cial to achieve the ethicalness and legitimacy of any biobank project 
launched with the task of pursuing the public good.
Biobanks have made a significant participatory turn, but relatively little 
scholarship regarding the laws and regulations of biobanks exists; thus, this 
article explores the normative importance of public engagement in biobank-
ing, and various models that can enable public engagement. Following Part 
I’s introduction, Part II reviews the regulatory and ethical controversies of 
biobanking. The Common Rule is the most relevant regulation, and its two 
major mechanisms for protecting biobank participants are de-identification 
and informed consent. Proposed revisions to the Common Rule considered 
10. The four widely recognized bioethical principles—respect for autonomy, nonmalef-
iecence, beneficence, and justice—were proposed by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Chil-
dress in their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, whose first edition was published in 1977. 
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS vii, 13 
(7th ed. 2013). The four principles share certain similarities with the Belmont Report’s three 
general principles relevant to human subjects research—respect for persons, beneficence, and 
justice, NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (THE BELMONT REPORT) Part B (1979),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf. The most 
significant difference between the two is the scope of application: while the Belmont Report is 
a document specifically addressing human subjects research ethics, Beauchamp and Chil-
dress’s four principles are designed to apply more broadly to general bioethical issues. See
Beauchamp & Childress, supra.
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bringing the secondary use of de-identified biospecimens into the scope of 
human subjects research regulations as well as granting research subjects 
the opportunity to give broad consent to enhance individual autonomy.
However, the proposal did not survive and was left out of the final version 
that became effective in 2018 because of the assumption that seeking con-
sent would impose a significant burden on biobanks and the fact that broad 
consent presents debatable ethical concerns. This article contends that the 
Common Rule, which was based on an assumption that specific research is 
performed on human bodies, did not adequately address the challenges of 
regulating biobanking. Part III assesses three major areas of ethical contro-
versy relating to biobanking—(1) informed consent, (2) privacy and confi-
dentiality, and (3) ownership and benefit-sharing. The discussions concern-
ing these three areas of controversy reveal a trend whereby participants are 
empowered to take on more active roles instead of being relegated to the 
status of passive subjects to be protected. Part IV addresses the relevance of 
public engagement to biobanking by reviewing ethical reasons as well as 
normative evidence in support of public engagement. The ethical aspects of 
the communal features of biobanking have inspired calls for public engage-
ment. Involving the public can help ensure that the operation of biobanks 
fulfills the common good, can serve as a method for implementing good 
governance, and can reinforce public trust. Domestic and international 
guidelines regarding biobanking have also added public engagement as a 
key element of ethical practices, all normatively confirming the necessity of 
public engagement. Part V examines international experiences with public 
engagement and categorizes them into four models. The various strategies 
to include and empower the public in different countries, despite their ad-
vantages and disadvantages, confirm an international consensus that public 
engagement in biobank governance is both feasible and desirable. This part 
also responds to critiques of public engagement, which are mostly based on 
administrative costs and people’s participatory competence. Part VI con-
cludes the article and argues that the relevance of public engagement can be
also supported by the emerging bioethical principle proposed by the Presi-
dential Commission for the Studies of Bioethical Issues (PCSBI)—
democratic deliberation. Democratic deliberation highlights the importance 
of public engagement, which resonates with the participatory turn in bi-
obanking elucidated in this article.
II. Regulation of Biobanking
Two different paradigms exist for biobank regulation. One relies on 
current regulations and results in the governance of biobanking by a variety 
of complicated and even sometimes conflicting rules. The other paradigm 
articulates a specific regulatory framework for biobanking. The United 
States’ regulatory regime takes the first approach. The most pertinent feder-
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al regulation is the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects Re-
search (known as “the Common Rule”). However, applying the Common 
Rule to biobanks is problematic because the Common Rule does not address 
the particular characteristics of biobanking activities. Proposed revisions to 
the Common Rule once sought to broaden the scope of human subjects re-
search to include the secondary use of de-identified biospecimens and man-
date the solicitation of research subjects’ broad consent to protect their au-
tonomy. However, the proposed expansion to the scope of human subjects 
research to include de-identified biospecimens was ultimately not adopted. 
The unsuccessful revision of the Common Rule seems to indicate the neces-
sity of seeking alternatives for appropriately regulating the ethical issues of 
biobanking.
A. Regulation Overview
The Common Rule is a set of regulations adopted independently by dif-
ferent federal agencies, among which the most well-known is the Human 
and Health Services (HHS) regulation codified as 45 CFR 46, part A.11 The 
Common Rule regulates research funded by federal agencies or conducted 
in institutes that agree to assume responsibility for the research in accord-
ance with the Common Rule regardless of the source of funding.12 The Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) also adopted certain provisions of the 
Common Rule that apply to clinical investigations regulated by the FDA, or 
clinical investigations that support new product applications or product 
marketing.13 The Common Rule was promulgated in 1991 and had mostly 
remained unchanged since then.14 Nevertheless, challenges raised by the 
new technology brought the necessity for revision in order to provide ade-
quate protection for research subjects. HHS published an Advanced Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in Federal Registrar in 2011, and later 
HHS published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) in 2015.15 After 
receiving more than 2100 comments,16 the final rule implementing major 
11. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, 27 (1999), 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf [hereinafter NBAC]; Federal Policy 
for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
12. NBAC supra note 11, at 28; 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2018).
13. See NBAC supra note 11, at 27-28; 21 C.F.R. § 56.101 (2018).
14. Victoria Berkowitz, Comment, Common Courtesy: How the New Common Rule 
Strengthens Human Subject Protection, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 923, 925 (2017).
15. Revised Common Rule, OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTS., https://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/finalized-revisions-common-rule/index.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2018).
16. Jerry Menikoff et al., The Common Rule, Updated, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 613, 
613 (2017).
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revisions to the Common Rule was formally announced in January 2017 and 
took effect in 2018 (Final Rule).17
The first challenge of applying the Common Rule to biobanks is that the 
use of human biological materials does not necessarily fit into the scope of 
the Common Rule. To start, the Common Rule only applies to research in-
volving human subjects, while research activities involving biobanks do 
necessarily fall within the scope of human subjects research. Human sub-
jects research is defined as that involving a living individual about whom an 
investigator conducting research obtains (1) data through intervention or in-
teraction with the individual, or (2) identifiable private information.18 Hu-
man subjects research by this definition must undergo review by an institu-
tional review board (IRB) and acquire subjects’ informed consent by 
disclosing required information.19 Based on this definition, when an investi-
gator interacts with a subject to obtain his or her samples or data, it qualifies 
as human subjects research.20
However, the problem is the use of banked samples and data. Working 
with stored samples and data is defined as human subjects research only 
when those samples and data are identifiable private information. The defin-
itive characteristic of “identifiable information” is that “the identity of the 
subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated 
with the information.”21 Guidance issued by the Office for Human Research 
Protection (OHRP) deems information not to be identifiable when the spec-
imens or data cannot be linked to specific individuals by the investigator di-
rectly or indirectly through coding systems.22 According to OHRP’s inter-
pretation, investigations using specimens or data from a coded repository 
are not considered human subjects research if there is an assurance based on 
certain agreements, policies or laws from the key holder not to release the 
decoding key to investigators.23 By OHRP’s standard, a biobank could serve 
as an efficient way of sharing as the key holder, as long as the biobank 
codes specimens and data and takes responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with regulatory requirements.
Next, even if research activities fall within the scope of human subjects 
research, they might be exempted from IRB review and other regulatory re-
quirements as long as they are unlinked or not publicly accessible. Accord-
ing to the Common Rule, the exemption applies when the identifiable in-
formation is publicly available, or the information “is recorded by the 
17. Revised Common Rule, supra note 15.
18. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (e)(1) (2018).
19. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2018).
20. NBAC, supra note 11, at 28.
21. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (e)(5) (2018).
22. Office for Human Research Prots., CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR SPECIMENS  
USE IN RESEARCH, GUIDANCE (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html.
23. Id.
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investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot 
readily be ascertained directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, 
the investigator does not contact the subjects, and the investigator will not 
re-identify subjects,”24 or when a broad consent has been authorized by the 
subjects when agreeing to opt in to the biobank.25 The criteria the investiga-
tor cannot acquire identifiable information of the research subjects is what 
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report refers to as 
unlinked samples— “samples lack[ing] identifiers or codes that can link a 
particular sample to an identified specimen or a particular human being.”26
Typically, biobank operators send unlinked samples to investigators.27 Such 
research is generally exempted from IRB review and other regulations, be-
cause it is unlikely that investigators, repository operators, or a third party 
can identify particular individuals in research conducted on such samples.28
Further, even if non-exempted human subjects research is conducted, it 
could be eligible for an expedited IRB review or a waiver of the require-
ment to obtain subjects’ informed consent. The IRB review may be expedit-
ed as long as the research involves no more than minimal risk.29 The OHRP 
is authorized to issue a list of categories of research eligible for expedited 
review, including many forms of human biological materials, such as blood
samples drawn by minimally intrusive methods, or a prospective collection 
of biological specimens gathered for research by noninvasive means, and 
data collections resulting from noninvasive procedures routinely employed 
in clinical practices.30 Research using biospecimens and data that have been 
collected or will be collected for non-research purposes (such as medical 
treatments or diagnoses) is also eligible for expedited review.31 Moreover, 
the IRB could waive the informed consent requirement to non-exempt hu-
man subjects research if all of the following criteria are met: (1) the research 
involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the research could 
not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; (3) the waiv-
er or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the sub-
jects; (4) research can only be practicably carried out by using identifiable 
private information or biospecimens; and (5) whenever appropriate, the sub-
jects will be provided with additional pertinent information after participa-
tion.32 The most critical criterion for a non-exempt protocol is usually 
24. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (d) (4) (i), (ii) (2018).
25. Id. § 46.104 (d) (8).
26. NBAC, supra note 11, at 18.
27. Id. at 58.
28. See id.
29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (b) (2018).
30. Office for Human Research Prots., OHRP EXPEDITED REVIEW CATEGORIES 
(1998), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/expedited98.html.
31. Id.
32. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (f)(3) (2018). It is also worth noting that the Final Rule provides 
an exception for the IRB waiver. If research subjects had been sought for broad consent for 
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whether it involves “minimal risk.”33 According to the NBAC’s opinion, re-
search using coded samples in the biobank is regarded as posing a minor 
risk to subjects, provided that the biobank and the researcher protect the pri-
vacy of subjects and have an appropriate plan on disclosure of research find-
ings.34
B. Proposed Revisions to the Common Rule
Applying the Common Rule to biobanks is not without challenges, 
however. Identifiability is a key factor in this framework. The Common 
Rule allows for a wider range of use and less-strict regulation on research 
when the samples and data involved is de-identified. The underlying ra-
tionale is that research using de-identified materials hardly hurt subjects. 
Nevertheless, criticisms of the standard of identifiability arise in terms of 
both technology and ethics. Reforms towards safeguards based on de-
identification could be found in ANPRM and NPRM. Despite that the pro-
posed revisions were not adopted in the Final Rule, it is worth reviewing 
those proposals when examining how the Common Rule protects research 
subjects in the context.
The technological challenge is that re-identification will become more 
likely, as biobanks proliferate, store and share ever larger amounts of infor-
mation. Re-identification usually requires identified or “reference samples,”
and biobanks make these samples more widely available.35 Some research 
has proven the possibility of identifying an individual from a sample, even 
when specimens and data are anonymized. A Science article in 2013 de-
scribed how to “google” identities of anonymized samples in genetic studies 
using little more than Internet sleuthing.36 Perfect de-identification seems 
hardly achievable when biobanks are designed to build massive collections 
of networked information.
secondary research use of identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens but 
refused to consent, then the IRB could not waive consent. Id § 46.116 (e).
33. See NBAC, supra note 11, at 31.
34. Id. at v (“Recommendation 10: IRBs should operate on the presumption that re-
search on coded samples is of minimal risk to the human subject if: a) the study adequately 
protects the confidentiality of personally identifiable information obtained in the course of 
research, b) the study does not involve the inappropriate release of information to third parties, 
and c) the study design incorporates an appropriate plan for whether and how to reveal find-
ings to the sources or their physicians should the findings merit such disclosure.”).
35. See Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 SCIENCE 
370, 370 (2006).
36. See generally Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname 
Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321, 321-24 (2013) (describing a study finding that the anonymity of 
genome sequencing could be breached by comparing anonymized data with publicly accessi-
ble genetic genealogy databases that could identify surnames of the subjects, and then com-
bining the information of surnames with other metadata such as age or residency of state).
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In addition, the ethical challenge is whether the benefits of using anon-
ymized specimens and data outweigh the principle of respect for autonomy. 
The Common Rule has treated de-identification (and even codification) as a 
sufficient and acceptable alternative to subjects’ informed consent.37 How-
ever, the public does not necessarily agree. For instance, in Beleno v. Lakey,
parents sued the state government, which had collected and stored newborn 
samples and subsequently made them available for undisclosed research 
purposes without obtaining parents’ consent.38 The plaintiffs alleged that 
they had suffered a violation of privacy even though specimens had been 
de-identified, arguing that de-identification did not cure the defect of failing 
to obtain consent initially.39 This case resulted in an out-of-court settlement 
that called for the destruction of more than 4 million collected specimens.40
De-identification in itself does not provide an adequate ethical foundation 
for research subjects to surrender their autonomy. Another problem is the 
lack of oversight in the use of purportedly anonymous material: research in-
dicates that researchers using human tissue samples without consent or IRB 
approval are more likely to use samples in an identifiable form rather than 
in the properly anonymized form.41
The NIH’s Genomic Data Sharing Policy (GDS Policy) represents a
significant shift towards requiring informed consent for the use of de-
identified biospecimens and data.42 To encourage data sharing that fosters 
genomic research, NIH requires all of its funded researchers who conduct 
genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and other genomic research to 
submit their de-identified studies to the NIH database, Genotype and Pheno-
type (dbGap).43 In 2014, the NIH announced the GDS Policy, which applies 
to all funded researchers who generate large-scale human and nonhuman 
genomic data and the use of these data for subsequent research and imple-
37. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, State Codification of Federal Regulatory Ambiguities in 
Biobanking and Genetic Research, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 299, 320 (2009).
38. See Complaint at 3-4, Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 
5:09-cv-00188).
39. See id. at 6.
40. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND
PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 49 (2012), https://bioethicsarchive.
georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.pdf [hereinafter PCSBI I].
41. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal Regulation of Biobanking Newborn Blood Spots for 
Research: How Bearder and Beleno Resolved the Question of Consent, HOUS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y, 2011, at 1, 43 n. 235 (referring to Jon Merz et al.’s research indicating that of 13 
studies performed without informed consent and IRB approval, only 3 used nonidentifable 
samples).
42. See Donna M. Gitter, Informed Consent and Privacy of Non-Identified Bio-
specimens and Estimated Data: Lessons from Iceland and the United States in an Era of 
Computational Genomics, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1277-78 (2017); NIH Genomic Data 
Sharing, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, https://osp.od.nih.gov/scientific-sharing/genomic-data-
sharing/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
43. See Gitter, supra note 41, at 1278.
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mented it in 2015.44 In light of the development of reidentification technolo-
gy that can cross-reference information from various sources, the GDS Poli-
cy requires researchers to obtain research participants’ consent for broad fu-
ture use and general sharing of data, even if biospecimens and data have 
been de-identified.45 Before the GDS Policy, a study of research participants 
whose de-identified data were submitted to the dbGap also indicated that 
most surveyed participants placed a high degree of importance on having 
their consent sought even for the use of de-identified data, and most of them 
(90%) had consented to share their data with dbGap.46 The GDS Policy re-
flects a different paradigm from the Common Rule, acknowledging the in-
sufficient protection offered by de-identification and calling for strengthen-
ing research participants’ autonomy.
The ANPRM and NPRM reflected similar concerns as the GDS Policy. 
One of the major changes proposed in the ANPRM, followed by the NPRM, 
was how to treat the secondary use of de-identified biospecimens. The 
ANPRM asked whether prior consent should be required when investigators 
use de-identified biospecimens, and if consent was required, whether such 
consent could be obtained for unspecified future research.47 Noting that bio-
specimens are intrinsically identifiable because of the genetic information 
they contain, the ANPRM proposed that investigators who use biospeci-
mens not be required to seek informed consent prior to its collection, re-
gardless of whether it is identifiable or not.48 In addition, the ANPRM pro-
posed a loosened standard for informed consent under which consent need 
not be study specific.49
The NPRM advanced a similar proposal as the ANPRM and called for 
expanding the definition of human research subjects. The NPRM proposed 
that “the obtaining, use, study, or analysis of biospecimens . . . be covered 
under the Common Rule, regardless of identifiability.”50 The NPRM also 
suggested that broad consent be permissible for unspecified future research 
rather than research using biospecimens be required to solicit consent spe-
44. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GENOMIC DATA 
SHARING POLICY 1-2 (Aug. 2014), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/NIH_GDS_
Policy.pdf.
45. Id. at 5; Gitter, supra note 42, at 1278-79.
46. Evette J. Ludman et al., Glad You Asked: Participants’ Opinion of Re-Consent for 
dbGap Data Submission, J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 2010 September, at 1, 6, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3071850/pdf/nihms279224.pdf.
47. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Sub-
jects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44512, 
44515, 44526-27 (proposed July 26, 2011).
48. Id. at 44526-27.
49. Id. at 44515, 44526-27.
50. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53933, 53944 
(proposed Sept. 8, 2015).
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cific to each study.51 In addition, even if the Common Rule’s expansion 
would not have been so broad as to cover all research using biospecimens, 
the NPRM also proposed two relatively minor expansions to include certain 
types of research: Alternative A proposed including Whole Genome Se-
quencing in human subjects research and Alternative B proposed including 
research that generates bio-unique information.52 Another key proposal of 
the NPRM was broad consent in light of the broadened scope of human sub-
jects research in research using all biospecimens. By balancing the protec-
tion of research subjects and the public interests of research, the NPRM 
suggested that broad consent be permissible for the storage or maintenance 
of biospecimens and identifiable information for secondary research; the 
secondary use of stored biospecimens would also have been permissible 
with research subjects’ broad consent and sufficient privacy safeguards.53
The NPRM also outlined the elements that would have been required to be 
contained in broad consent.54
Nevertheless, the Final Rule only adopted broad consent for identifiable
biospecimens and did not expand the scope of human subject research to in-
clude de-identified biospecimens because of strong objections to the NPRM 
contained in public comments received. Commenters expressed concerns 
that the change would create significant administrative burdens because in-
vestigators would have to re-identify existing samples in order to seek con-
sent.55 Commentators also argued that the burden of seeking consent would 
significantly impair investigators’ abilities to undertake important re-
search.56 Conversely, the benefits of seeking consent seemed to be too min-
imal to offset the costs and harms. Many commenters opined that broad 
consent was ethically questionable. Research subjects would have no way to 
fully consent given the limited information about future research.57 Broad 
consent would not stimulate real dialogues between investigators and re-
search participants but would rather reduce the likelihood of research sub-
jects making fully informed decisions concerning the use of biospecimens.58
Nevertheless, the Final Rule permits broad consent for the secondary use of 
identifiable biospecimens and information.59 According to the old Common 
Rule, most investigators, considering the cost of seeking re-consent when 
using identifiable materials, would choose de-identification to exempt from 
51. Id. at 53973.
52. Id. at 53945-46.
53. Id. at 53973.
54. Id. at 53973-74.
55. Berkowitz, supra note 14, at 956-57.
56. Id.; Menikoff et al., supra note 16, at 613.
57. Berkowitz, supra note 14, at 957-58.
58. Id. at 958.
59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (d)(8) (2018).
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regulation or seek waiver from the IRB.60 In any event, many still believe 
that the broad consent codified in the Final Rule still enhances research sub-
jects’ autonomy by granting them more opportunities to make choices re-
garding the use of their data.61
After the implementation of the Final Rule, the storage and mainte-
nance of biospecimens and data require broad consent if they are identifia-
ble. Investigators using materials from a biobank, however, are not mandat-
ed to seek consent either personally or through biobank operators because 
banked materials are considered to be de-identified from the investigators’
view. Although the NPRM’s proposed change regarding de-identified bio-
specimens was not adopted, the NPRM’s reasoning is illuminating. Com-
pared with the ANPRM’s focus on the potential identifiability of biospeci-
mens, the NPRM appealed to public opinion and public trust. The NPRM 
contended that the enterprise of publicly funded research is increasingly un-
tenable because of concerns about research using de-identified biospeci-
mens without seeking consent, which the majority disfavors because of the 
effect on legitimate autonomy.62 The NPRM argued that it was necessary for 
the research community to seek permission from the people providing bio-
specimens and data to build trust and partnership with the public.63 Further, 
surveys referred to by the NPRM64 and related literature65 indicated that 
people have a growing sense of entitlement to their materials and are willing 
to actively exercise those rights.
III. Ethical Challenges and the Need for 
Public Engagement
Based on abovementioned regulatory challenges, it could be found that 
biobanks introduce unique ethical concerns that the Common Rule frame-
work for human subjects research cannot completely address. In this Part, I 
further examine three relevant ethical questions, all of which highlight the 
challenges that biobanking poses to the current ethical framework. The cur-
rent ethical framework has not been able to provide satisfying answers to 
these challenges because it fails to consider the communitarian aspects of, 
and the complicated socio-economic meanings behind, biobank projects. 
60. See Menikoff et al., supra note 16, at 615. However, the two options of not seeking 
research subjects’ consent—de-identification or IRB waiver—remain to be available in Final 
Rule. Id.
61. See id.
62. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53944.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 53938.
65. Ludman et al., supra note 46, at 6; S.B. Trinidad et al., Research Practice and Par-
ticipant Preferences: The Growing Gulf, 331 SCIENCE 287, 287-88 (2011).
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Further, a consensus towards empowerment of participants can be found 
among discussion of these ethical debates.
A. Informed Consent
Biobanking brings ethical challenges to informed consent. Informed 
consent requires disclosure of detailed information of research; however, it 
is intrinsically difficult for any biobank designed for general future use to 
specify all the research it will support in the future.66 Although an alterna-
tive model, broad consent, has been adopted by the Final Rule and other in-
ternational laws, it remains to be seen whether the broad consent really pro-
tects the subjects.67 The new challenge to informed consent is a reason to 
consider whether there are aspects not covered by the existing regulatory 
framework.
1. Difficulties of Gaining Specific Consent and Alternatives
Specific informed consent is difficult because of biobanks’ nature as re-
sources for uncertain future research. The trend of building large-scale data-
bases, with interconnected biospecimens and data for sharing, only serves to 
make the ultimate uses of materials more uncertain. Moreover, individual 
scientists may not be able to disclose comprehensive information in an in-
formed consent protocol. Because a wide range of scientific expertise is 
brought to bear in biobank research, participating scientists may themselves 
have only a partial understanding of the full scope of research.68 Further, 
seeking specific consent for every research program or project is costly. A 
strict informed consent standard may also hamper new research if important 
studies are thwarted by not having biospecimens and data numerous or rep-
resentative enough.69
In response to questions of specific consent, one solution is to loosen 
the criteria of informed consent. Although there are some who hold that 
specific consent should be required whenever using identifiable samples and 
data,70 there are at least three alternatives with different degrees of authori-
zation by participants: presumed consent, broad consent, and layered con-
66. JANE KAYE ET AL., GOVERNING BIOBANKS: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY 
BETWEEN LAW AND PRACTICE 291 (2012).
67. See infra Section III.A.1.
68. KAYE ET AL., supra note 65, at 290.
69. See PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 91; BERNICE ELGER, Consent and Use of Samples,
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNING BIOBANKS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 57, 59 (Bernice Elger 
et al. ed., 2008).
70. See ELGER, supra note 68, at 58-59 (exemplifying that a report made by the Ameri-
can Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) in 1996 contended that specific consent should al-
ways be required, including both prospective and retrospective studies, while the report ex-
plicitly stated blanket consent to be inappropriate).
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sent.71 The most general authorization is presumed consent. The Icelandic 
HSD Act adopted this paradigm, which automatically enrolled existing 
medical/healthcare data into the database and gave participants the choice of 
opting out.72 This approach has attracted controversies for infringing on sub-
jects’ autonomy. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the PCSBI report in 
2012 also recommended presumed consent. The PCSBI report prefers the 
opt-out model over an opt-in model, believing that both respect autonomy, 
but the default of participation will increase the participation rate, and thus 
benefit scientific and medical research.73
The most widely accepted format is broad consent or blanket consent.74
Broad consent means that participants are asked to consent to the use of 
their materials for any future research, provided that the research is ap-
proved by an IRB or a research ethics committee.75 In the Final Rule, broad 
consent is permitted only with respect to the storage, maintenance, or sec-
ondary research uses of identifiable private information and identifiable bio-
specimens, in an effort to balance subjects’ autonomy with practicability of 
research.76 Broad consent in the Final Rule allows flexibilities on specifying 
information when seeking consent from research subjects.77 Internationally, 
the Human Genome Organization (HUGO) recognizes that blanket consent 
should be allowed in some cases.78 The model of broad consent has been 
widely adopted by many large biobanking projects.79 Broad consent is more 
flexible for researchers, but it might be ethically problematic. Participants 
71. Besides the three different types of informed consent, the PCSBI also names the 
fourth category— participant-centric or dynamic consent. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 89.
72. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ICELAND’S RESEARCH RESOURCES: THE HEALTH 
SECTOR DATABASE, GENEALOGY DATABASES, AND BIOBANKS 8 (2004),
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/icelandic_research.pdf. However, presumed consent only applies 
to the databases of health information. Broad consent or limited consent is required in terms 
of biological samples unless samples are taken from clinical care treatments. Id. at 11-12.
73. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 92.
74. Rieke van der Graaf & Johannes J.M. van Delden, Exploring an Alternative to In-
formed Consent in Biobank Research, in HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH: A EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 15, 17 (Christian Lenk et al. ed., 
5th ed., 2011).
75. Sigurdur Kristinsson & Vilhjálmur Árnason, Informed Consent and Human Genetic 
Database Research, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC 
DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 199, 213 (Matti Hayry et al. eds., 2007).
76. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (a) (2018).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (d) (2018). Broad consent only requires general descriptions of 
the type of potential research, the type of information or biospecimens shared, the type of in-
stitutions or researchers, the period of time of sharing, etc. The reasonable person standard 
continues to apply to broad consent. See § 46.116 (a) (4), (d) (2).
78. HUGO Ethics Comm., Statement on Human Genomic Databases art. 4(a) 
(Dec. 2002), http://www.hugo-international.org/Resources/Documents/CELS_Statement-
HumanGenomicDatabase_2002.pdf.
79. Kristin Solum Steinsbekk et al., Broad Consent Versus Dynamic Consent in Bi-
obank Research: Is Passive Participation an Ethical Problem? 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS
897, 897 (2013).
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are not provided with much information before making their decision, so it 
is questionable whether consent given under such conditions would be val-
id.80 Ethical abuses are likely to happen when participants provide samples 
to be used without limits because they do not have the capability to foresee 
risks.81
Layered consent is a model meant to compensate for the problems of 
blanket consent. Participants are given multiple options to give or refuse 
samples to be used for certain purposes or to request re-contact for consent 
to any research. The NBAC report proposes this model, arguing that consent 
forms should be developed to provide subjects with a sufficient number of 
options, such as: (a) refusing future use; (b) permitting only unidentified or 
unlinked use; (c) permitting identified or coded use for one particular re-
search, but no further contact to ask for permission to do further studies; (d) 
same with (c) but with further contact permitted to ask for permission to do 
further studies; (e) permitting identified or coded use for any study relating 
to the original condition, with further contact allow to seek permission for 
other studies; or (f) permitting coded use for any kind of future study.82
Nevertheless, layered consent is criticized as too costly and too complicat-
ed.83 It is also criticized for its potential to hinder large-scale population re-
search by letting individuals opt out from the research.84 Layered consent 
undermines the original purposes of revising traditional informed consent in 
order to facilitate the use and sharing of information, as it may result in par-
ticipants’ decreased or narrowed scope of collaboration.85
Despite the fact that broad consent has been generally adopted, it is eth-
ically debatable whether broad consent can really serve as the mechanism to 
protect and respect autonomy. The PCSBI finds that the majority of people 
are willing to share their data and agree with the existence of DNA data-
bases, provided people can choose not to participate in the databases.86 Stud-
ies also show that most people want to be asked whether their biological 
materials can be used in research, while at the same time people are willing 
to donate their materials to support research.87 However, the exercise of au-
tonomy is not expected to be too complicated and time-consuming, as sur-
veys also find that most participants prefer to give a one-time general con-
sent.88 Alternative models to specific informed consent attempt to find a 
80. Kristinsson & Arnason, supra note 73.
81. ELGER, supra note 68, at 59.
82. NBAC, supra note 11, at 64-66.
83. ELGER, supra note 68, at 79-80.
84. See id. at 80-81.
85. See id. at 71.
86. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 90.
87. Leslie E. Wolf, Advancing Research on Stored Biological Materials: Reconciling 
Law, Ethics, and Practice, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 99, 142-43 (2010).
88. Id. at 143.
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balance between respecting participants’ autonomy over their biological do-
nations on the one hand, and facilitating research that involves banked mate-
rials on the other. Models of informed consent all tend to focus on the mo-
ment when participants agree to join, but biobanks are a long-term program 
in which participants are in an ongoing relationship with the database, 
which differs from the typical short-term relationship between investigators 
and subjects in the setting of traditional human subjects research.
2. After Consent: A Sustained and Continuing Relationship
A critical weakness of informed consent in the context of biobanking is 
that it simply focuses on consenting to opting-in to biobanks or not. This 
fails to account for the future-oriented nature of biobanks whereby partici-
pants’ biospecimens and data are repeatedly used by the biobanks.
One approach to supplementing informed consent relies upon other 
mechanisms through which research ethics are ensured. Many scholars in-
terpret open consent as having a different effect than specific consent. Open 
consent does not mean general consent to the use of data and the risks and 
benefits of research, but only to certain mechanisms of use and sharing of 
biospecimens and data. Henry T. Greely opined that broad consent should 
only be considered a grant of permission rather than an expression of real 
consent and research involving biobanks should be reviewed by an IRB 
with strict procedures.89 Singurdur Kristinsson and Vilhjalmur Arnason also 
interpreted blanket consent to actually mean that IRBs should make deci-
sions concerning the permissibility of future research activities.90 Kaye and 
Gibbons proposed that consent be given to an agreeable form of governance 
and oversight of future use of materials; for example, a suitably constituted 
data-access committee that would oversee future use.91 These interpretations 
share a common emphasis on seeking an effective mechanism to protect 
participants’ interest rather than just disclosing sufficient information re-
garding specific research.
Another approach proposes ongoing contact with participants after re-
ceiving the initial informed consent. Informed consent has been criticized 
because it only provides participants a “take-it-or-leave-it right” whereby 
they can either agree to or decline to participate.92 A study demonstrated that
broad consent had the support of a majority; however, people also expressed 
a preference for opportunities to be informed about the use of their materi-
als. People also expressed a desire to maintain control over, or at least have 
89. Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework for 
Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 737, 762 (1999).
90. Kristinsson & Arnason, supra note 75, at 213-14.
91. KAYE ET AL, supra note 65, at 291.
92. Evans, supra note 9, at 248.
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some input with respect to, their stored materials.93 Jonathan S. Miller pro-
posed a model of “broad consent with recontact” in which broad consent 
would be obtained from participants as well as permission to recontact 
them.94 Through regular recontact, biobanks could develop a sustained in-
teraction with participants, which would stimulate an ongoing discussion 
between biobanks and participants.95 Participants could ensure that they 
were making truly autonomous decision about the use of their materials on 
the basis of updated information.96 Sustained interaction could also facilitate 
research on stigmatized conditions because participants would be more will-
ing to opt into sensitive research initiatives in a context of better understand-
ing and trust.97 Models that seek “dynamic consent” attempt to use technol-
ogies to facilitate communication with participants and to provide 
participants with fairly specific options of types of research to support from 
which they can choose.98
These proposed alternatives to informed consent share a goal on shift-
ing the focus from the moment of collection to the ongoing relationship. 
Ongoing dialogue reinforces transparency and mutual trust. Maintaining 
public involvement also helps achieve good governance and efficient over-
sight because both of these require public input and accountability to the 
public. Ongoing communication is also essential for informing participants. 
Sophisticated civic-minded participants could contribute to biobank projects 
not only with their materials but also with their expertise concerning risk 
management, value judgments, and the pursuit of general welfare.
B. Confidentiality and Privacy
Biobanks are often considered a threat to privacy.99 Surveys in Europe-
an countries with large-scale biobank projects show that the use of personal 
information in genetic research is a major public concern.100 While autono-
my has been the major principle leading debates regarding confidentiality 
and privacy,101 discussions on challenges of big data and corresponding new 
93. Christian M. Simon et al., Active Choice But Not Too Active: Public Perspectives 
on Biobank Consent Models, 13 GENETICS IN MED. 821, 828 (2011).
94. Jonathan S. Miller, Can I Call You Back? A Sustained Interaction with Biospeci-
men Donors to Facilitate Advances in Research, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 (2015).
95. Id. at 40.
96. Id. at 40-41.
97. Id. at 41.
98. Chalmers et al., supra note 4, at 10.
99. Salvor Nordal, Privacy, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC 
DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 73, at 181, 181.
100. Id.
101. According to the PCSBI’s analysis, respect for person is the most essential princi-
ple for analyzing privacy concerns of the whole genome sequencing. PCSBI I, supra note 40,
at 21, 45-48.
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regulatory proposals suggest increasing awareness of the relevance of public 
engagement.
1. Privacy Law Related to Biobanks
In the research context, the Common Rule stipulates that an informed 
consent statement shall include a description of the extent to which “the 
confidentiality of records identifying subjects will be maintained.”102 The 
Common Rule provides higher protection to identifiable biospecimens and 
data than anonymized ones. It allows samples obtained in clinics to be 
stripped of identifiers and broadly used in research without obtaining further 
informed consent and IRB review.103
In the clinical context, the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act of 1996 (HIPAA)104 is the federal law most relevant to medical 
privacy. Through the HIPAA, Congress delegates the HHS to enact national 
data privacy and security standards, by which the HHS issued Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy Rule”).105
The HIPAA and its Privacy Rule apply to “covered entities,” which include 
(1) a health plan, (2) a healthcare clearinghouse, and (3) a healthcare pro-
vider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection 
with certain electronic transactions.106 If the covered entities engage with a 
business associate to carry out their function to provide healthcare, the 
HIPPA and the Privacy Rule also applies to the business associate.107 Cov-
ered entities are prohibited from using and disclosing individually identifia-
ble “protected health information” (PHI) without individuals’ authorization, 
unless some enumerated exceptions exist.108 PHI is “individually identifiable 
health information” that is translated by or maintained in electronic media 
or other forms of media.109 “Individually identifiable health information”
means that the information (1) is created or received by a healthcare provid-
er or other covered entities and (2) relates to the physical and mental health 
or condition of an individual, the provision of healthcare to individuals, or 
the payment of provisions to individuals.110 Also, such information is indi-
vidually identifiable “with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to be-
102. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (a)(5) (2018).
103. See supra Section II.A.
104. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996).
105. Id. § 264 (directing the Secretary of the HHS to submit standards of privacy protec-
tion); 45 C.F.R. §§160, 164 (2018).
106. 45 C.F.R. §160.103 (2018).
107. Id. §§ 160.102–160.103.
108. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018).
109. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
110. Id.
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lieve the information can be used to identify the individual.”111 The Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act 
extends privacy protection: it addresses privacy and security concerns asso-
ciated with the electronic transmission of health information and strengthens 
civil and criminal enforcement of HIPAA provisions.112 To sum up, the two 
major mechanisms of privacy protection of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule are 
de-identification and subjects’ consent.
However, even if the health information is identifiable, the Privacy Rule 
allows research use of PHI without individual’s authorization. A covered 
entity is permitted to use and disclose PHI for research purposes without in-
dividuals’ authorization, provided that: (1) the covered entity obtains an al-
teration or waiver of authorization approved either by the IRB or the Priva-
cy Board; or that (2) the use and disclosure of PHI is for activities prepara-
preparatory to research; or that (3) the use and disclosure of PHI is solely 
and necessary for research on decedents’ PHI.113 A covered entity may also 
use or disclose a “limited set of data” of PHI for research purposes without 
authorization.114 A “limited set of data” is PHI from which certain specified 
direct identifiers of individuals and their relatives, household members, and 
employers have been removed.115 According to the Privacy Rule, banked 
health information could be used for research without subjects’ consent 
even if the information is identifiable under the above circumstances. The 
Privacy Rules’ permission of broad categories of use without consent (in-
cluding exceptions for research use) has been criticized for its departure 
from the HIPAA’s origin of protecting patients’ control over PHI.116
Another regulation applies specifically to genetic information. The Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) protects individuals 
against genetic discrimination in health coverage (Title I) and in employ-
ment decisions (Title II).117 Although GINA prohibits misuses of genetic in-
formation by health insurers and employers, it is an anti-discrimination law, 
which does not provide comprehensive data protection.118 GINA authorizes 
the HHS to revise the Privacy Rule to clarify that genetic information is 
111. Id. De-identified health information is thus exempted from HIPAA. Id.
§§160.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)-(b). Information is de-identified either by statistical and scien-
tific standards or removing enumerated identifiers. Id. §164.514(b).
112. HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(d), 123 Stat. 226, 272-73 (2009).
113. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2018).
114. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2018).
115. Id.
116. Deborah C. Peel, An Implementation Path to Meet Patients’ Expectations and 
Rights to Privacy and Consent, in INFORMATION PRIVACY IN THE EVOLVING HEALTHCARE 
ENVIRONMENT 89, 92-93 (Linda Koontz ed., 2013).
117. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
GINA].
118. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 66-67.
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health information, in order to regulate the use and disclosure of genetic in-
formation by insurers for underwriting purposes and employers.119
The right to know and the right not to know are also core issues of fair 
information practices.120 The question in the context of biobanks is whether 
incidental findings shall be made known to participants. The latest trend in 
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA)121 and the Priva-
cy Rule by the HHS moves towards granting individuals greater access to 
their health information, in order to empower them in healthcare deci-
sions.122 The CLIA and accompanying regulations limit disclosure of labora-
tory test results only when the laboratory complies with the CLIA stand-
ards.123 A CLIA laboratory may only disclose laboratory test results to three 
categories of individuals or entities: authorized persons, persons responsible 
for using the test results in treatments, and referring laboratories.124 An “au-
thorized person” is defined by state laws that authorize individuals to order 
or receive test results.125 This definition means that individuals may not have 
a right to gain access to their testing results if the state law lacks regulation. 
The latest amendment in 2014 broadens the scope of disclosure such that a 
CLIA laboratory may release completed test reports to patients by their re-
quest if the result can be identified to that patient.126
The privacy laws just discussed do not specifically address issues of 
confidentiality and privacy related to biobanks. The Common Rule draws 
the line on identifiability in the sense that no participants are traceable and 
no rights are violated.127 However, besides weaknesses in complete anonym-
ity, another problem is that longitudinal studies cannot be carried out effec-
tively with anonymized data that is static and not updated dynamically.128
Most biobanks code biospecimens and data and hold the key from second-
ary researchers instead of stripping identifiers permanently. Although under 
OHPR’s guidelines coded biospecimens and data used by researchers with 
no access to the key are considered de-identified information,129 the speci-
mens and data are actually re-identifiable and the protection to privacy re-
119. GINA § 105.
120. Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC 
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 45 (Mark 
A. Rothstein ed., 1997)
121. 42 U.S.C. §263a (2018).
122. The amendment has been in effect since April, 2014. See CLIA Program and 
HIPAA Privacy Rule: Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014).
123. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 95-96.
124. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f) (2018).
125. Id. § 493.2.
126. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(l) (2018).
127. See Bartha Maria Knoppers & Ma’n H. Abdul-Rahman, Biobanks in the Literature,
in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNING BIOBANKS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 69 at 13, 
17.
128. See id. at 17.
129. Office for Human Research Prots, supra note 22.
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lies heavily on security. The HIPAA and HITECH Act only apply to “cov-
ered entities” and cooperating business associates, which are mostly health 
care providers. In this case, clinical sites collecting and storing materials are 
covered entities. However, given the design of biobanks to share widely, 
secondary users, who are usually distant from the collecting site, are not 
covered entities. Nor does HIPAA apply when samples are collected by re-
searchers who are not healthcare providers, such as in population-based re-
search that collects non-diseased samples. GINA as an anti-discrimination 
law has a narrow scope. It does not address many privacy concerns raised 
by biobanking, such as autonomy over information and bodies, security, 
stigmatization, and the psychological impact of research findings on indi-
viduals and groups.
2. Regaining Control of Information: 
Beyond Informed Consent and De-Identification
Many of the characteristics of biobanks make privacy concerns perplex-
ing. First, biobanks’ major collections are sensitive because of the genetic 
information embedded in biospecimens. Moreover, biobanks are usually in-
terlinked with other databases. The privacy issues of big data are rather 
complicated and the risk is difficult to evaluate. Technologies that enable re-
identification challenge the protection offered by de-identification;130 how-
ever, informed consent does not provide a particularly satisfying mechanism 
in response to biobanks’ new paradigm of data collection, processing, and 
use. The means by which biobanks control banked materials are usually 
complicated and alien to research participants, and therefore participants 
cannot meaningfully exercise control over their banked materials. Partici-
pants also have little chance to participate in shaping research through giv-
ing informed consent, but much research concerns profiling or categorizing 
participants. The current regulatory framework mainly relies upon the 
mechanisms of informed consent and de-identification, but neither of these 
provide satisfying solutions to the challenges posed by biobanking.
To regain control over information, several alternatives to informed 
consent and de-identifiability have been proposed. One suggestion is to in-
crease transparency.131 Transparency provides information for participants 
130. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010). Re-identification science involves 
techniques that can unlock identities by discovering uniqueness in the remaining data, even if 
administrators have removed any important identifiers. Scientists found surprising uniqueness 
in non-personally identifiable information, such as ZIP codes, birth dates, and sex in US popu-
lations. Identification is possible through cross-referencing and analyzing these non-
identifiable data points. Id. at 1723.
131. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in 
the Age of Analytics, 11 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 270-72 (2013); Julie E. Cohen, 
Privacy and Technology: What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1932 (2013).
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necessary to decide whether to remain in the database. It also strengthens 
accountability of the database operators and researchers. Omer Tene and 
Jules Polonetsky underscore the necessity of disclosing the decisional crite-
ria of decision-making, i.e., the factors database operators consider.132 They 
find the analysis of big data is interpretative, and factors decided by opera-
tors—such as the definition of the data set, the hypothesis, or the algo-
rithms—affect the results.133 The transparency requirement is argued to have 
a legal basis on due process—individuals should be informed the basis for 
decisions affecting their life.134 There is also a suggestion to increase acces-
sibility of data. Individuals should have access to the collected data in a use-
ful format and are allowed to let their data analyzed by third-party applica-
tions.135
Another group of suggestions for regaining control focuses on building 
trust in regulation. Compared to individual control (through informed con-
sent) or technical protection (through de-identification) of information, this 
group of suggestions underscores the function of institutions. For instance, 
Yianni Lagos and Jules Polonetsky propose administrative controls as an 
additional layer of safeguards to de-identification that could reduce risk of a 
data breach.136 Control over information is realized through public trust in 
institutions. Onora O’Neill proposes to build trustworthy institutions to sup-
plement the limits of informed consent. Recognizing that individuals cannot 
be expected to adequately grasp the uses to which their information is put, 
O’Neill believes that the practical approach is to let individuals consent 
based on trustworthy backgrounds.137 Paul Ohm also argues that while de-
identification no longer ensures privacy, regulators should take many human 
factors into accounts to balance privacy and countervailing values, among 
which includes trust.138 Ohm contends that the loss of trust in technology 
should be supplemented by trust in people.139 The law and regulation of pri-
vacy should reflect different degrees of public trust to different institutes.140
The aforementioned alternatives share a consensus view that promotes
both shifting the focus from the initial stage of data collection to the later 
stages of data storage and use and involving people in an examination of the 
legitimacy of purposes as well as evaluation of risks and benefits of data 
132. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 130, at 271.
133. Id.
134. Id; Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43 (2013).
135. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 131, at 264.
136. Yianni Lagos & Jules Polonetsky, Public v. Nonpublic Data: The Benefits of Ad-
ministrative Controls, 66 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 103, 104 (2013).
137. Onora O’Neill, Informed Consent and Genetic Information, 32 STUDS. HIST. &
PHIL. BIOL. & BIOMED. SCIS. 689, 701-02 (2001).
138. Ohm, supra note 130, at 1765-68.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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use. This shift responds to privacy concerns raised by genomic research and 
big data research, which are the main research approaches that benefit from 
biobanks. Both these approaches demonstrate that privacy protection re-
quires a collective view that goes beyond individual decisions. With respect 
to genomic research, all human beings are part of a big family that shares 
approximately 99 percent of genomic data. My neighbor sharing her bio-
specimens containing genetic data could affect me.141 The success of ge-
nomic research relies upon human biospecimens, and the benefits of re-
search that unravel the mysteries of human life or promote progress in 
medicine are usually beneficial to the general welfare; yet, big data analysis 
also has a similar communal aspect because its privacy issues are compli-
cated and transcend individual concerns. Threats to privacy from big data 
collection are not just about the collection or use of each person’s personal 
information, but rather about the privacy concerns raised by data aggrega-
tion and cross-referencing that can lead to the unexpected identifiability of 
data or data analysis that results in profiling or social classification that vio-
late the self-identity of data subjects. Results could also possibly be used to 
categorize people in such a way that the value judgments underlying big da-
ta research negatively influence their public or private life.142 Moreover, ge-
nomics and big data usually interlink different sources of biospecimens and 
data. Any individual could hardly have comprehensive information concern-
ing how their materials have been used at the moment of giving consent and 
thereafter. Thus, people’s decisions to share their personal specimens could 
possibly affect each other because of the common human genome and the 
interconnection of data.
Public engagement is highly relevant to privacy protection. Biobanking 
and the research it supports utilize data in such a way that privacy is inter-
dependent and individuals cannot protect their interests simply through their 
own autonomous decisions.143 Effective privacy protection must turn to em-
powering data subjects. People should be encouraged to participate in de-
bates and policy discussions regarding the proper use of their information144
and the value judgments underlying algorithms or results analysis. It has al-
so been argued that if people could access data in a meaningful and engaged 
manner, they would become a natural check on the inappropriate use of data 
and encourage compliance with privacy laws.145 Barbra J. Evans also pro-
posed to examine the collective nature of autonomy and self-governance of 
data citizens because autonomy entails that people have the power to organ-
141. Evans, supra note 9, at 250-51.
142. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 40 (2013).
143. Evans, supra note 9, at 250-51.
144. Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and 
Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 52 (2013).
145. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 131, at 269.
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ize themselves and defend their rights through collective bargaining.146
These responses to the privacy challenges of biobanks all entail strengthen-
ing public engagement as a possible solution.
C. Ownership and Benefits
An important characteristic of biobanks is that benefits generated by the 
scientific use of banked materials will not accrue to individual participants. 
However, the great potential for deriving economic value from human bio-
logical materials and increasing commercial involvement challenges the 
practice that donors of biospecimens and data have no rights over benefits 
generated from research. Benefit-sharing proposes a new paradigm to an-
swer questions of unfairness, as subjects or donors are not recognized as 
owners of innovations generated from their biospecimens and data. Never-
theless, benefit-sharing alone does not solve the ethical question of distribu-
tive injustice. A just mechanism of benefit-sharing requires deliberation 
through public engagement.
1. Controversies over Property Rights
The question of who owns our bodies—whether we have property 
rights over our tissues and genetic and health information—raises many de-
bates in the context of biobanks. Traditionally, the human body and body 
parts were not treated as property because they were of neither biomedical 
nor commercial values.147 It is the modern biomedical applications, such as 
organ transplantation and human subjects research, that utilize the human
body and grant individuals proprietary values in their bodies.148 Biobanks 
further complicate the issue because the purpose of biobanks is to share and 
transmit data, a purpose which conflicts with the exclusivity of property 
rights.
United States’ courts have decided against patients’ claim to property 
rights over human biological materials used in research. In Moore v. Re-
gents of the University of California, a patient claimed ownership over cells 
removed from his body later used in lucrative research; however, the court 
rejected the ownership argument.149 The UCLA physician researchers who 
treated Moore were only liable to the extent that they failed to obtain in-
formed consent by failing to disclose that they were engaged in research.150
146. Evans, supra note 9, at 247.
147. See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Legal Paradigms of Human Tissues, in HUMAN 
TISSUE RESEARCH: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES, 
supra note 74, at 87-88.
148. Id. at 88.
149. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal. 1990).
150. Id. at 480.
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Later in Washington University v. Catalona,151 the court rejected the claim 
that participants have rights over samples they donate to biobanks. In spite 
of participants’ right to withdraw, the right did not equate to a right to con-
trol and use the excised biological materials.152 The court also recognized 
that medical research can only advance if access to these materials by the 
scientific community is not thwarted by private agendas.153 Catalona
sparked debate over patients’ rights versus scientific research in terms of 
property rights—assuming that there is property right over human tissues, 
whether donation extinguishes the right.154 Critics of Catalona argue for do-
nors’ rights, believing Catalona is grounded in paternalistic ideas and un-
fairly bars patients from deciding how to use their own excised tissues.155
Those who defend patients’ property rights believe that, without such rights, 
patients’ voices would not be heard by universities or biotechnology enter-
prises.156 Furthermore, patients’ loss of control over the downstream uses of 
their samples, and their skepticism about commercial exploitation of their 
biological materials, would ruin public trust.157
The traditional practice favoring scientists and denying participants’
contribution is questionable. Robert Mitchell describes participants as con-
tributing “clinical labor” to a biobank.158 Moreover, denying participants’
control over their biospecimens does not necessarily promote free access for 
scientific innovation. Participants who request to withdraw usually have not 
done so for proprietary benefits but instead in the interest of saving their bi-
ospecimens from commercial exploitation or research viewed to be deni-
grating to certain racial or ethnic backgrounds.159 Taken together, these con-
troversies prove that the notion of property rights cannot appropriately 
address the distributive justice issues raised by biobanks.
2. Benefit-Sharing and Distributive Justice
Benefit-sharing is proposed as a new alternative for distribution be-
tween donors and users. This idea dates back to the Rio Convention on Bio-
diversity (CBD) of 1992, which is an attempt to acknowledge the contribu-
tions of local people with a more inclusive and nuanced view to assess their 
151. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F. 3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
152. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
153. Id. at 1002.
154. DONNA DICKENSON, BODY SHOPPING: THE ECONOMY FUELLED BY FLESH AND 
BLOOD 124 (2008).
155. See id. at 120.
156. See id. at 127.
157. Id. at 128-29.
158. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 333-34.
159. Wolf, supra note 87, at 118.
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contribution.160 The CBD addresses the risk of exploitation of biodiversity 
and traditional knowledge and calls the recognition of contributions of local 
people; however, the CBD also implicitly assumes that natural resources or 
traditional knowledge could be subject to ownership rather than commons 
that is free for taking.161 The application of the CBD to human genome 
could be problematic because human genome cannot be owned by anyone, 
as the Human Genome Organization (HUGO) declared that human genome 
as a common heritage of humanity.162 Neither could people be considered to 
make contributions to research simply because they own certain genes.
It could be argued that benefit-sharing both addresses the conflicts of 
interests and fulfills the demands of redistributive justice as well. To whom 
the benefits of biobanking should flow and what the benefits are require fur-
ther examination. The whole community, instead of individuals, is consid-
ered to be the appropriate subject to be rewarded in order to prevent contro-
versies regarding the property right and undue inducement.163 As for what 
benefits to share, the HUGO Ethics Committee considered that the benefits 
are not identical with proprietary profits, but should be determined based on 
needs, values, priorities and cultural expectations.164 Benefits could be 
shared in the other forms besides financial interests, such as access to 
healthcare or public dissemination of research results.165 The ideas of shar-
ing with the community and sharing both proprietary and non-proprietary 
benefits imply that benefit-sharing is based on equity, not on recognition of 
subjects’ proprietary right over their donations.166
Benefit-sharing seems to provide justification for the biobank mecha-
nism, but it does not constructively deal with the conflict of interest between 
participants and researchers. An access fee is usually required to be paid by 
users— researchers of banked materials and data— especially those who 
seek commercial benefits. However, the question remains as to whether us-
ers could be required to pay back more than access fees. An empirical study 
finds that practitioners around the world, despite agreeing that certain bene-
fit-sharing schemes should exist, have little consensus on how such schemes 
should operate.167 Because benefit-sharing provides social compensation and 
160. See Kadri Simm, Benefit-Sharing and Biobanks, in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE 
OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES supra note 75, at 159, 160 n. 4, 161.
161. See id.; Cori Hayden, Taking as Giving: Bioscience, Exchange, and the Politics of 
Benefit-Sharing, 37 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 729, 735 (2007).
162. See Simm, supra note 158, at 161.
163. Hayden, supra note 159, at 746.
164. Simm, supra note 160, at 166.
165. See id. at 166-67.
166. Hayden, supra note 160, at 742-43.
167. Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra, Benefit-Sharing and Remuneration, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
GOVERNING BIOBANKS, supra note 69, at 217, 228.
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acts as a foundation for public trust to biobank projects,168 the institution of 
benefit-sharing should also be formed through a legitimate process. One of 
the recommendations made by the HUGO’s “Statement on Benefit-Sharing”
also notices that “there [should] be prior discussion with groups or commu-
nities on the issue of benefit-sharing.”169
Cori Hayden maintains that benefit-sharing allows for a new approach 
of “giving-back” as the legitimacy of science, compared to the “speaking-
for” approach taken by social and anthropological studies of science.170 The 
speaking-for approach recognizes that scientific knowledge not only depicts 
the nature, but also represents or “speaks for” different interests in the socie-
ty.171 Based on the speaking-for approach, legitimate science requires inclu-
sion of people to represent their interests, such as those public participation 
initiatives in policy-making on bioscience.172 By contrast, benefit-sharing 
represents a different model of legitimate science that research is something 
that can “give back.”173 However, the issue of inclusion and political repre-
sentation is as essential for giving-back as speaking-for. Benefit-sharing 
does not pay interests back to individuals, given its origin from respect of 
the local community or ethical concerns against undue inducement to re-
search subjects; instead, benefits should return to the community or the col-
lective.174 Hayden argues that benefit-sharing does not simply address the 
unequal relations of exchange, but rather it concerns the broader issue of 
mechanisms of distribution and redistribution.175 The ethics of benefit-
sharing has to deal with the question of the forms of political representation 
and the mode of resource allocation.176 Advocates of benefit-sharing by bi-
obank operators and researchers have been paying less attention to the poli-
tics of distribution, which may result in benefit-sharing to be skeptically a 
slogan to facilitate research instead of serving the social compensation duty. 
A justifiable benefit-sharing mechanism is based upon a speaking-for de-
mocracy. Public engagement is necessary for justifiable distribution.
168. Dianne Nicol & Christine Critchley, What Benefit Sharing Arrangements Do Peo-
ple Want from Biobanks? A Survey of Public Opinion in Australia, in PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE IN BIOBANK GOVERNANCE 17, 28 (Jane Kaye & Mark Stranger eds., 2009).
169. HUGO Ethics Comm., Statement on Benefit-Sharing (Apr. 9, 2000), 
http://www.hugo-international.org/Resources/Documents/CELS_Statement-BenefitSharing_
2000.pdf.
170. Hayden, supra note 160, at 732-33.
171. Id. (referring to Bruno Latour’s notions that “science as itself a ‘parliament’ or a 
process of forging a new ‘democratic collective,’ ” and that “scientific knowledge performs a 
kind of double representational act, bringing the realms of nature and politics together in one 
fell swoop.”).
172. Id. at 732-33.
173. See id. at 746-747.
174. Id. at 734-41.
175. Id. at 747-48.
176. Id. at 753.
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D. Public Engagement as a Solution to Ethical Challenges
The three previously discussed ethical controversies surrounding bi-
obanks demonstrate that biobanks challenge the current ethical framework. 
Discussions of these three issues suggest that it is necessary to empower 
participants to have a more active role than their current status permits. De-
bates over the appropriate models of consent have gradually shifted the fo-
cus to establishing long-term relationships with participants and continuing 
to involve participants after consent is obtained. Debates concerning confi-
dentiality and privacy demonstrate that individuals have minimal control of 
their materials once they opt in to a biobank project. Privacy is also interde-
pendent in the context of biobanking where participants must empower 
themselves through participating in collective decision-making rather than 
exercising discrete individual choices. Debates concerning ownership and 
benefits also indicate that a fair distribution of benefits requires a scheme 
formed through public engagement. In fact, the importance of public en-
gagement has been highlighted by ethicists and policymakers; moral and 
normative calls for public engagement have continued to grow louder.
IV. Ethical and Normative Calls for Public Engagement
The current ethical framework cannot adequately address the challenges 
posed by biobanking, but public engagement or participation has come to be 
seen as a sine qua non for biobanking activities.177 The calls for public en-
gagement have arisen on the basis of various ethical reasons and purposes 
that are identified and evaluated hereafter. Further, the latest professional 
and policy guidelines also serve as normative evidence in support of the ne-
cessity of public engagement. Such normative evidence further demon-
strates that public engagement must be considered in biobanking regulation 
and governance.
A. Ethical Reasons for Public Engagement
1. The Collective Nature of Biobanks
Arguments in favor of public participation take into account the defin-
ing characteristics of biobanking. One reason to favor public engagement is 
because it relates to the national identity as well as to community benefits. 
Advocates of biobanks have linked biobanks to the work of nation-
building178 with respect to the role biobanks play in reinforcing or shaping 
the notions of nation, citizenship, and community. Barbra Prainsack exam-
177. See Knoppers & Abdul-Rahman, Biobanks in the Literature, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN 
GOVERNING BIOBANKS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 127, at 13.
178. See GOTTWEIS & PETERSEN, supra note 2, at 10.
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ined three Israeli biobanks and discovered that they were designed to pre-
serve genetic components of the “collective body” of Israel.179 The three bi-
obanks attempted to reflect the “homogeneity” of the population, conceiving 
of the collective body of Israel as Jewish, notwithstanding the fact that 23 
percent of the population is non-Jewish.180 Biobanks are a method for shap-
ing identities of an entire community, and thus require democratic legitima-
cy, which depends on public engagement.
Other collective features of biobanks also demonstrate the importance 
of public engagement. The effects achieved and interests promoted by bi-
obanks are beyond the individual. Thus, participants must be involved in a 
process of shared decision-making. Because risk assessment is difficult, this 
aspect of biobanking also implies a need for public engagement. Biobanks 
involve genomic science and data interlinkage, both of which generate un-
certain risks. Nevertheless, these uncertainties are not simply scientific and 
medical issues that could be solved through technology, but rather are issues 
that combine complex scientific and societal factors. Public engagement can 
open the process of risk management to different stakeholders beyond scien-
tific and academic professionals.
2. Communitarianism and the Common Good
Another argument in favor of public engagement arises from the com-
munitarian turn aiming to revise the individualistic assumption of bioethics. 
The impact of research on groups is particularly relevant in the context of 
biobanks whose mission is to sponsor and enable research to enhance public 
health. The NBAC report points out the limits of an individualistic interpre-
tation for its failure to address group needs or group harms.181 The NBAC 
report proposes to involve certain groups when designing research proto-
cols, because the research may have negative impacts on those groups.182
Yet, paradoxically, biobank projects often use a rhetoric suggesting that 
their benefits will come from personalized medicine or individually tailored 
treatments and therapies.183 The communitarian turn is not simply based on 
consideration of group impacts but also on the necessity of revisiting the re-
lationship between individuals and collectives that has been a core issue in 
public health.184
179. See Barbra Prainsack, Research Populations: Biobanks in Israel, 26 NEW 
GENETICS AND SOC. 85, 85, 97 (2007).
180. See id. at 97.
181. See NBAC, supra note 11, at 46-47.
182. Id. at 50.
183. Ruth Chadwick & Mark Cutter, The Impacts of Biobanks on Ethical Frameworks,
in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 219, 224.
184. Id. at 225.
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The main idea of the communitarian turn is the common good, which 
emphasizes public engagement over individual informed consent. A bi-
obank is an institution constituting social assets and communitarian val-
ues.185 The common good perspective holds that a good life is maintained by 
social conditions that make it possible to form opinions about what kinds of 
life community members want to live.186 The common good is the prerequi-
site for the protection of individual freedom and rights.187 In light of the 
common good, individual autonomy has been better respected and protected 
by participants’ discussion of the common good influencing the priorities of 
research use, rather than by strict criteria of informed consent.188
Some even believe that there is a moral obligation for each community 
member to contribute to the communal biobank project based on the com-
mon good. Rosamond Rhodes argues that society should institute obligatory 
participation in medical research at regular intervals for all citizens, consid-
ering that human beings are vulnerable to injuries and diseases and contri-
butions of clinical research to the all human beings.189 John Harris proposes 
that participation in research is a moral duty resulting from non-maleficence 
and justice.190 Lars Oystein Ursin and Berge Solberg also argue for a moral 
obligation to participate because medical research is usually “politicized”
through concepts such as citizenship, community, and patriotism, while the 
reason to oppose research is also political.191 These arguments for moral ob-
ligation in medical research usually describe participation in research out of 
a sense of community membership or citizenship.192 Thus participants 
should be involved in a way similar to their exercise of citizenship, in a way 
that goes beyond informed consent.
3. Good Governance
The third argument for broader public engagement is based on a belief 
that participation is the principle of good governance. First, a practical con-
sideration is the influence of participants and stakeholders, as biobanks rely 
on the support of participants and many other social resources. Kaye et al.’s
185. Erik Christensen, Biobanks and Our Common Good, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH 
BIOBANKING 101, 103 (Jan Helge Solbakk et al. eds., 2009).
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 112.
189. Lars Øystein Ursin & Berge Solberg, The Health Dugnad: Biobank Participation 
as the Solidary Pursuit of the Common Good, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH BIOBANKING,
supra note 185 at 219, 220.
190. Id. at 221.
191. Id. at 235.
192. Some hold the view that participation in medical research is a civic obligation, sim-
ilar to paying taxes or military conscription; however the obligation is not legally compulsory. 
See SØREN HOLM ET AL., Conscription to Biobank Research? in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH 
BIOBANKING, supra note 185, at 255, 256-57, 261-62.
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empirical studies find that many practitioners of biobank research regard 
stakeholders’ concerns as important, despite the fact that these stakeholders 
currently do not have any direct role in the regulatory framework.193 Public 
engagement is relevant because it helps those who run biobanks understand 
and respond to public concerns.
Moreover, public engagement helps change the power asymmetry in the 
current governance framework. Traditionally, research ethics relies heavily 
on self-governance and lacks transparency. Critics to informed consent ar-
gue that this emphasis works to entrench power inequality between re-
searchers and participants.194 To challenge the current power asymmetry, a 
new approach to governance needs not only to disclose information, but also 
needs mechanisms for communication and representation to build partner-
ships with participants,195 such as including donor representation in the gov-
erning body of a biobank. Biobank operators’ and researchers’ accountabil-
ity would be strengthened through mechanisms of empowerment, were 
participants granted a more equal position from which to evaluate potential 
risks and benefits of research.
4. Public Trust
The fourth frequently mentioned reason for public engagement is to 
build public trust, which is particularly relevant for large-scale biobanks run 
or sponsored by public funds.196 Besides the intuitive argument that trust is 
important because biobanks would fail without the support of participants
and society, there are also several features that make trust crucial. First, the 
operation of biobanks involves risks, safety, and security matters that cannot 
be solved by technical advancement alone, for these are matters of inter-
twined social and scientific factors. These matters are also connected to the 
notion of responsibility, such as questions as to whether biobank operators 
and researchers can show enough trustworthiness to deal with them properly 
and effectively.197 Moreover, while there are many purposes publicized to 
193. KAYE ET AL., supra note 65, at 291. Kaye et al. recognized that it is necessary to 
consider stakeholders’ interests and concerns; however, they believed that granting stakehold-
ers a direct voice in biobank governance may go too far. Id.
194. Nadja K. Kanellopoulou, Reciprocity, Trust, and Public Interest in Research Bi-
obanking: In Search of a Balance, in HUMAN TISSUE RESEARCH: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 74, at 45, 47-48.
195. Id. at 51-52.
196. According to a survey of four European countries with national biobanking pro-
jects, trustworthiness is the main concern among them. Respondents agreed with the im-
portance of bioscientific research but were cautious about privacy issues. MATTI HAYRY &
TUIJA TAKALA, Bioethical Analysis of the Results: How Well Do Laws and Regulations Ad-
dress People’s Concerns? in THE ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC 
DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 249, 250.
197. Cornelia Richter, Biobanking: Trust as Basis for Responsibility, in TRUST IN 
BIOBANKING 43, 43 (Peter Dabrock et al. eds., 2012).
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promote biobank initiatives and some of them conflict with each other, such 
as commercialization and public benefits, there seem to be no mechanisms 
to oversee whether all the purposes are appropriately pursued.
Legislation has been a way to build public trust by forcing biobanks to 
submit to management in compliance with ethics,198 yet legislation’s focus 
on informed consent and data protection does not fully address trust.199 Trust 
is not necessarily built through informed consent or assured by legal con-
tracts. According to Cornelia Richter, “[t]rust is built through recognition; it 
may evolve when people think and act similarly or loyally support each oth-
er’s otherness.”200 Richter argues that trust is based on social stability gained 
from social consensus but not restricted to traditional life, 201 and it should 
take into account more than knowledge and consent by considering the 
sense of uneasiness, fear, and need for security.202 In this sense, public en-
gagement plays a role in building and affirming trust as a necessary process 
to shape consensus and recognition as well as to form respectful relation-
ships between different stakeholders. Public engagement is especially rele-
vant to assuring biobanks’ public health purpose whenever trust is under-
mined by commercialization. Klaus Hoeyer finds that the health needs 
pursued by biobanks are co-produced with social definition of and 
knowledge about health and illness, while commercialization might bias the 
judgment.203 Hoeyer thus argues for multiple decision-making regimes to 
consider broader views and to prevent a homogenization of decision-making 
according to a market-oriented priority.204 Public engagement could serve as 
the mechanism for legitimate decision-making as well as providing check 
and balance to commercial uses.
Paradoxically, critics of trust also originate from the perspective of en-
hancing public engagement. Critics contend that trust relies upon the author-
ity of experts, making the assumption that experts are the ones competent to 
know the correct answer and to make the right decisions.205 However, in re-
ality issues regarding biobanks encompass genuinely uncertain and unpre-
dictable factors.206 Critics believe that trust-building is intrinsically in con-
flict with public engagement. A trusting person is “an intermediary state 
198. HAYRY & TAKALA, supra note 196, at 253.
199. See Pascal Ducournau & Roger Strand, Trust, Distrust and Co-Production: The 
Relationship Between Research Biobanks and Donors, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH 
BIOBANKING, supra note 185, at 115, 117; Klaus Hoeyer, Trading in Cold Blood? Trustwor-
thiness in Face of Commercialized Biobank Infrastructures, in TRUST IN BIOBANKING, supra 
note 197 at 21, 35.
200. Richter, supra note 197, at 45.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 42.
203. Hoeyer, supra note 199, at 35.
204. Id.
205. Ducournau & Strand, supra note 199, at 127.
206. Id.
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between being knowledgeable and ignorant[,]” implying an abstention from 
exercising critical and autonomous judgment.207 Emphasizing public trust 
reproduces the asymmetry between experts and laypeople, implying that lay 
participants are incapable of participating in biobank governance.208 Pascal 
Ducournau and Roger Strand thus argue that democratic participation is 
necessary in order to heightened the quality of scientific research as well as 
to improve the scientific knowledge’s relevance to the general public.209
Vilhjálmur Árnason also proposes an opt-out system with informed trust to 
re-consent, believing that dynamic interchanges with participants offer bet-
ter conditions for empowerment.210
The aforementioned ethical reasons that suggest the need for public en-
gagement reflect that participation in a biobank project is not simply an in-
dividual choice, but also involves a citizen’s choice to participate in public 
affairs. Features of biobanks indicate that these projects are the concern of 
the whole community in need of a communal method of governance, 
(re)distribution, and identity-formation. Given this communal nature, public 
engagement is necessary, not only to achieve practical goals such as gather-
ing enough samples or gaining enough public investment, but also to 
achieve normative aims such as democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
Some rationales for public engagement also contend that citizens have a 
moral duty to contribute to biobank projects, and in turn contend that citi-
zens should be empowered to share in decision-making. Such rationales link 
biobanks with citizenship and thereby further strengthen the role of public 
engagement in biobanking.
B. Normative Evidence for Public Engagement
An emerging consensus with respect to the necessity of public engage-
ment is also evident in policy and ethical guidelines regarding biobanking. 
Such guidelines also provide normative grounds for public engagement be-
cause they usually urge the relevant authorities to formulate laws or policies 
employing their principles.211 They also serve as important references for 
governmental lawmaking and biobank operators’ policymaking.
Public engagement has been highlighted in international documents. 
The World Medical Association published the Declaration of Taipei on Eth-
207. Id. at 118.
208. Id. at 125.
209. Id. at 129.
210. Vilhjálmur Árnason, Scientific Citizenship, Benefit, and Protection in Population-
Based Research, in THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH BIOBANKING, supra note 185, at 131,137.
211. WMA Declaration of Taipei on Ethical Considerations Regarding Health Data-
bases and Biobanks, WORLD MED. ASS’N para. 24 (Oct. 2016), https://www.wma.net/
policies-post/wma-declaration-of-taipei-on-ethical-considerations-regarding-health-databases-
and-biobanks/; UNESCO Int’l Bioethics Comm., Report of the IBC on Big Data and Health,
para. 117, U.N. Doc. SHS/YES/IBC-24/17/3 Rev.2 (Sept. 15, 2017).
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ical Considerations Regarding Health Databases and Biobanks (Declaration 
of Taipei) in 2016.212 Based on ethical principles governing human subjects 
research, the Declaration of Taipei noted that large-scale databases collect-
ing biospecimens and data have the potential to promote new research strat-
egies but also create risks for misuse and abuse of those databases.213 The 
Declaration of Taipei intended to find an ethical standard that would take 
into account the research participants’ willingness and trust in addition to 
ensuring a high standard of protection of their rights.214 In addition to the 
right to consent, the Declaration also explicitly declared that participants 
have a right of access to their data as well as the right to correct it.215 More-
over, the Declaration requires databases to be responsible to the whole 
community rather than simply to participants. Principles of good govern-
ance espoused in the Declaration exhibit a broad scope that goes beyond da-
tabase participants: transparency requires that relevant information be avail-
able to the public; participation and inclusion requires database operators to 
involve participants as well as their communities; and accountability re-
quires responsiveness to all stakeholders.216 The mandate to be accountable 
to the general public reflects the communal nature of databases such as bi-
obanks that have purposes and benefits that affect the entire public.
The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization also underscored the im-
portance of public engagement in its report on big data and health.217 The 
report proposed that biobanks or large databases designed for broad future 
research adopt “dynamic consent.”218 Dynamic consent empowers partici-
pants to monitor data with the help of information technology.219 Partici-
pants are involved in an ongoing fashion and they can “vote for” or opt out 
of research depending on whether they support it—this turns the project into 
a joint enterprise between participants and researchers and lowers the risk of 
exploitation.220 The IBC also deemed citizen involvement or engagement to 
be an element of good governance that would prevent the exploitation, ma-
nipulation, or improper control of data.221 Citizen involvement is not simply 
a preferable approach for protecting individual rights. The report indicated 
212. Declaration of Taipei, WORLD MED. ASS’N, https://www.wma.net/what-we-
do/medical-ethics/declaration-of-taipei/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. WMA Declaration of Taipei on Ethical Considerations Regarding Health Data-
bases and Biobanks, supra note 209, at para. 14.
216. Id. para. 20.
217. See generally UNESCO Int’l Bioethics Comm., supra note 211. The scope of this 
report includes databases such as biobanks. See id. para. 51.
218. Id. paras. 51, 55.
219. Id. para. 55.
220. Id.
221. Id. para. 103.
Spring 2019] Bank on We The People 275
the problem of democratic legitimacy that besets most big data projects. Big 
data projects or databases promise to deliver public benefits; however, those 
projects usually lack a democratic mandate from the people in which the no-
tion of public good is defined.222 In light of the questionable publicity of big 
data projects or databases, an ethical governance framework must guarantee 
that a real public good is promoted.223 With respect to the elements contrib-
uting to good governance, the IBC also mentioned engaging participants 
through various means such as keeping participants informed224 or involving 
them in the design of governance procedures over service providers.225 The
IBC considered public engagement to be not only a safeguard for individual 
rights but also a mechanism for oversight or a check on the publicity of big 
data projects or databases.
Public engagement is at the core of the Precision Medicine Initiatives 
(PMI)’s guidelines, the Privacy and Trust Principles (“PMI Principles”). 
The PMI Principles were drafted by an interagency working group assem-
bled by the White House, and their task was to consider and finalize an ethi-
cal guideline over the activities of the initiatives.226 Despite sharing certain 
similar ethical commitments with other guidelines concerning biobanks, the 
PMI Principles do not address much with respect to the appropriate ap-
proach for handling difficult ethical problems. The PMI Principles instead
articulate guidance based on the initiatives’ spirit—participants as part-
ners.227 The PMI Principles are based on an appeal to people to engage in 
the science of medicine as active collaborators and to not only share their 
biospecimens and data but also to participate in decision-making concerning 
the use of stored materials.228 Epitomizing this spirit, the first rule of the 
PMI Principles stipulates that “[g]overnance should include substantive par-
ticipant representation at all levels of program oversight, design, implemen-
tation, and evaluation.”229 The second principle also stipulates that 
“[g]overnance should create and maintain active collaborations” among var-
ious stakeholders.230 In addition to citizen participation in governance, two 
more major approaches for strengthening the partnership with civil society 
222. Id. para. 104.
223. Id.
224. Id. para. 109(o).
225. Id. para. 109(q).
226. Precision Medicine Initiative: Privacy and Trust Principles, NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/program-overview/precision-medicine-initiative-
privacy-and-trust-principles#precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles-6 (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2018) [hereinafter PMI Principles].
227. PMI WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 1.
228. See id.
229. Governance, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, para. 1, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/
program-overview/precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles#precision-
medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles-1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
230. Id. para. 2.
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are proposed. One is the empowerment of participants, which aims to im-
prove participants’ understanding and to facilitate participants’ access to 
their information in consumer-friendly ways.231 The other is respecting par-
ticipant preferences—the PMI should involve participants in a dynamic and 
ongoing dialogue on the use and sharing of data, permitting them to exercise 
their autonomy in a meaningful way.232 Compared with other ethical or poli-
cy guidelines, the PMI Principles further propose concrete directions for 
achieving public engagement in a project that operates a large-scale data-
base.
To summarize, guidelines underscoring public engagement are support-
ed by both normative and practical reasons. The importance of public en-
gagement results from the fact that many biobanks or similar large-scale da-
tabases appeal to citizen engagement. The PMI and the PMI Principles 
provide a key example of the connection between the two trends. The PMI 
seek to leverage a highly engaged population, collect abundant data, and 
“usher in a new and more effective era of American healthcare.”233 The PMI 
also aim to reflect the diversity of the population in sampling,234 which 
sounds quite similar to a governance body that is mandated to represent the 
political diversity of the people. The PMI and other recent guidelines seem 
to endorse the approach of people-powered science in which people work 
together to assemble large-scale resources for research and also enjoy a cer-
tain degree of self-governance.235 Here, self-governing means not only rights 
but also responsibilities to actively participate. Another reason for participa-
tion is that the human genome is the commons, and people share mostly the 
same genes and are interdependent. Scholars describe the rights as well as 
responsibilities as genomic citizenship—individuals have rights and respon-
sibilities to access genomic information as well as participate in decision-
making on matters that affect the community or even the nation.236 Many 
biobanks face ethical or financial challenges; citizens who are invested in 
biobanks help to sustain those databases. The link between citizens and bi-
obank projects demonstrates the relevance of public engagement. Partici-
pants as well as stakeholders, based on their citizenship, should have the 
231. Participants Empowerment Through Access to Information, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH, para. 3, https://allofus.nih.gov/about/program-overview/precision-medicine-
initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles#precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-
principles-3 (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
232. Respecting Participant Preferences, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, para. 2-3, 
https://allofus.nih.gov/about/program-overview/precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-
trust-principles#precision-medicine-initiative-privacy-and-trust-principles-3 (last visited Oct. 
8, 2018).
233. PMI WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 1.
234. Id. at 2.
235. Evans, supra note 9, at 262.
236. Sabatello & Appelbaum, supra note 8, at 292-93.
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right as well as responsibility to join in governance or collective decision-
making of biobank projects.
V. Making Public Engagement Possible:
Various Approaches
Given the importance of public engagement, the next question is how 
people may become engaged. In the following section, I will review differ-
ent models of public engagement. The origins and practices of these models 
reflect an awareness of the limits of current research ethics and the need for 
public engagement in the context of biobanks. These models not only pro-
pose different approaches of how to involve the public, but also reveal dif-
ferent views of how to incorporate the idea of public engagement into re-
search ethics. A summary of the models reviewed appears in appended 
Table 1.
A. Community Engagement
Models of community engagement can be categorized based on the 
presence or absence of “teeth” (i.e., having the legally-binding power to en-
force compliance) into group consent and community consultation, respec-
tively. Group consent grants groups veto power and community consultation 
treats communication with the community as a supplement to regulatory re-
quirements for biomedical research.
1. Group Consent
The notion of group consent can be traced to the Model Ethical Protocol 
(hereinafter “the Protocol”), which was draft by the North American Re-
gional Committee (NAmC) of the Human Genome Diversity Project 
(HGDP) in response to criticisms raised by advocates of indigenous move-
ments.237 The Protocol contends that group consent is required in addition to 
individual consent because of the group-defining nature of HGDP’s popula-
tion research.238 The Protocol requires researchers to seek informed consent 
through the subject community’s “culturally appropriate authorities where 
such authorities exist” before they begin sampling.239 Researchers may seek 
consent from the larger group provided the existence of a “larger identity 
among the population” and “the existence within the broader group of enti-
ties that the population itself recognizes as culturally appropriate authori-
237. JENNY REARDON, RACE TO THE FINISH: IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE 
OF GENOMICS 98-99 (2005).
238. Dr. Kenneth M. Weiss et al., Proposed Model Ethical Protocol for Collecting DNA 
Samples, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1431, 1443 (1997).
239. Id. at 1443-44.
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ties.”240 Compared to the Common Rule, which only requires individual 
consent without granting the group any role, the notion of group consent 
further extends the notion of informed consent, regarding groups as the sub-
ject of consent. However, most believe that group consent does not replace 
individual consent but serves as an additional layer of safeguard.241 Group 
consent is described to grant a “veto power” to the study population,242 that 
is, the study population has the power to approve or veto research protocols 
despite consent obtained from individuals.
Critics of group consent target two major assumptions held by the Pro-
tocol. First, the assumption that these groups exist and could serve as an ap-
propriate unit for consent (the Protocol expects scientific researchers to de-
fine groups by their sampling criteria243). Second, the assumption that an 
authority exists that is capable of consenting on behalf of the whole 
group.244
As to the first of these, critics point to the complexity of “groupness,”
while the Protocol assumes that groups could be defined by researchers’
sampling criteria. Defining groups or communities is never simple or clear-
cut but comes with varying criteria. For instance, the Canadian debates re-
garding the definition of “community” in public health policy include at 
least three divergent but overlapping perspectives, such as population, cul-
ture, and nation.245 The variant delineations of community reveal that the 
definition of group is neither “natural” nor neutral.246 The subjective ap-
240. For example, the Navajo group is one of the large populations among Native Amer-
icans speaking Na Dene. The Navajos consider themselves as an independent group with its 
people and culture. There is a Navajo tribal government comprising a President and a tribal 
council. When investigators intend to take samples in a Navajo village, they must seek con-
sent both from the village and the tribe. Id. at 1444-45.
241. See Richard R. Sharp & Morris W. Foster, An Analysis of Research Guidelines on 
the Collection and Use of Human Biological Materials from American Indian and Alaskan 
Native Communities, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 165, 177 (2002); Joan L. McGregor, Population Ge-
nomics and Research Ethics with Socially Identifiable Groups, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 356, 
366 (2007).
242. Richard R. Sharp & Morris W. Foster, Involving Study Populations in the Review of 
Genetic Research, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 41, 41, 42 (2000).
243. REARDON, supra note 237, at 100.
244. Id.
245. See Fern Brunger, Problematizing the Notion of “Community” in Research Ethics,
in POPULATIONS AND GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 245, 248-53
(Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 2003). Community as population considers the group identity—
including race, gender and social classes— in relation to risks of disease. Community as cul-
ture echoes multiculturalism movements and policy, assuming the community shares similar 
interests and advocates a culturally sensitive approach to health care. Community as nation 
not only imagines the community as highly homogeneous and cohesive but also grants it clear 
political authority. This perspective is significant regarding the aboriginal community since 
the term “research” is usually synonymous with exploitation and group consent is supported 
by both political empowerment of aboriginal communities as well as the federal multicultural 
policy of respect for cultures. Id.
246. Id. at 246.
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proach to self-definition is also taken up by aboriginal communities as a po-
litical struggle for their power and rights.247 In contrast, the Protocol takes 
the notion of community as being able to be defined objectively and scien-
tifically by assuming the group exists and could be defined by researchers. 
This perspective closes off the possibility of open debates about the exist-
ence of groups and the appropriate way to define groups. Researchers’ au-
thority of definition might even reinforce the colonial notion of race and in-
digeneity.248 In fact, the North American Regional Committee (NARC) of 
the HGDP drafted the Protocol in response to indigenous movements, 
whose primary concern is that the HGDP reinforces a colonial aspect over 
their identity and threatens their autonomy.249 Yet the Protocol was drafted 
upon a belief that groups can be demarcated and substantiated by scientific 
evidence without involving broader societal and moral debates. Group con-
sent thus does not provide a satisfying proposal for respecting group auton-
omy.
The more essential problem is that group consent might reinforce racial 
categories from a biological basis. Skeptics to population-based research or 
research based on race are concerned about the possibility that genetic dif-
ferences might be used to justify discrimination against minorities. One ar-
gument is that health disparities among populations are complicated matters 
that involve various biomedical and societal factors, of which genetic varia-
tion is only one. This view worries about genetic reductionism or genetic 
determinism that overestimates the power of genetic research to disclose the 
secrets of human lives and diseases, while neglecting other factors affecting 
health status.250 Another argument contends that the racial category is not 
scientifically significant but rather socially constructed. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee 
et al. point out that the genetic variation within human populations is greater 
than that between population groups.251 Using racial categorization in a re-
search design implies an anticipation of finding differences between popula-
tions, but this anticipation is biased and may preclude more nuanced stud-
ies.252 This view also argues against genetic reductionism or genetic 
determinism that understands identities as ascribed by science instead of by 
self-identification.253 Some above-mentioned examples of how biobank pro-
jects have served as nation-building or as governance to reinforce national 
247. See REARDON, supra note 237, at 100, 103.
248. Id. at 100.
249. Id. at 105.
250. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Meaning of “Race” in the New Genomics: Implica-
tions for Health Disparities Research, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 33, 38-39
(2001); McGregor, supra note 241, at 362.
251. Lee et al., supra note 248, at 39.
252. Id. at 42.
253. Id. at 52. As Lee et al. describe, this is a shift of explanatory power into genetic 
discourse in identity politics. Id.
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identity could be adduced again as examples of population-based research 
being used to maintain or reinforce current social categories or identities. 
Group consent is criticized because it either enforces categorizations by sci-
ence or reinforces existing categorizations by providing scientific support 
for them—both of which run contrary to the original purpose of group con-
sent to respect participants’ and the community’s autonomy.
The second locus of criticisms directed at group consent surrounds who 
has the authority to speak for group members. The Protocol says that re-
searchers shall seek consent from “culturally appropriate authority” or “in-
stitutions that provide a useful focus for community discussions and consen-
sus,” such as the tribal government or “informal authorities” like “elders, 
religious leaders, traditional leading families or clans, or other people rec-
ognized within the culture as having authority.”254 Conceding to difficulties 
in seeking candidate cultural authority, the Protocol encourages the IRB to 
demand explanation from researchers about this.255 However, critics find 
that it is difficult, practically speaking, to find the cultural authority if the 
group lacks political structure, especially when the group in question is geo-
graphically diffused.256 A theoretical criticism also considers that group con-
sent undermines variations within a group. Minorities or vulnerable mem-
bers of the group are usually not well represented if they do not have equal 
standing in the community.257 Group consent assumes homogeneity in the 
group, yet even within a group of certain homogeneity there are still diverse 
values regarding what is the common good.
A more fundamental question might be why a group has a moral right 
to speak for its members. Here I argue that empowerment of participants, 
rather than respect for communitarian values, is the real justification for 
group consent. Most of the above-mentioned critics take issue with the 
communitarian assumption, which regards individuals as self-identified 
through their group identities and not isolated atoms. In this sense, individu-
al autonomy remains the focus, which is also what group consent really in-
tends to protect. Group consent may still be found to be unsatisfying be-
cause individual identities are too complicated to be simply defined as the 
subject of informed consent. Neither does this communitarian assumption 
provide solutions to conflicts existing between individuals and groups. Ad-
254. Dr. Kenneth M. Weiss et al., supra note 238, at 1146.
255. Id.
256. McGregor, supra note 241, at 366.
257. See Erica Haimes & Michael Whong-Barr, Competing Perspectives on Reasons for 
Participation and Non-Participation in the North Cumbria Community Genetic Project, in 
POPULATIONS AND GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 245,
at 199, 212; Henry T. Greely, Informed Consent and Other Ethical Issues in Human Popula-
tion Genetics, 35 ANNUAL REV. GENETICS 785, 794 (2001) (mentioning that the federally 
recognized tribal or national government is not necessarily representative to minorities within 
its group).
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vocates of group consent mostly agree that individual consent cannot be 
waived, but they pay little attention to the power structure within the group. 
Granting the group veto power seems to be paternalistic or even morally 
hazardous because group consent does not necessarily enhance individual 
autonomy. Lee et al. propose to return to individual consent because the in-
dividual decision itself reflects values of collectives whom the individual is 
embedded in.258
However, the history of the Protocol as a response to concerns raised by 
indigenous movements suggests that group consent recognizes the sover-
eignty of aboriginal groups against exploitation in the name of research. Yet 
as Jenny Reardon argues, group consent in the Protocol fails to deal with 
concerns of indigenous movements.259 Group consent only expands in-
formed consent from individuals to groups, without dealing with complicat-
ed issues regarding the political and historical realities of colonialism and 
north-south relations.260 Reardon describes group consent’s failure as the 
limit of the western bioethical framework that is not able to pay attention to 
fundamental questions of power.261 Meanwhile, despite critics concerns 
about the definition of groups and cultural authority, group consent has been 
widely accepted in the context of recognized groups, such as aboriginal 
groups. Hank T. Greely also describes congressional legislation for a na-
tional biobank project as a form of group consent; for example the Icelandic 
biobank obtained group consent through public debates and congressional 
legislation, the HSD Act.262 Such examples of group consent are less con-
troversial, not only because of their clarification of groupness and authority, 
but also because these groups are defined by a political process that takes 
various social and political concerns into consideration instead of relying 
solely on the scientific perspective. To summarize the pros and cons of 
group consent, the real purpose of group consent should be to empower par-
ticipants by involving them, either directly in debate or indirectly by includ-
ing their representatives in decision-making bodies.
2. Community Consultation
Community consultation has been recommended by many ethical 
guidelines in the context of human subjects research involving communities 
with cultural differences or different public health policies.263 The Council 
258. Lee et al., supra note 250, at 62.
259. REARDON, supra note 237, at 98.
260. See id. at 98-99.
261. Id. at 124-25.
262. Greely, supra note 257, at 787.
263. E.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL 
SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 79 (2011), 
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%20June%
202012.pdf [hereinafter PCSBI II]; 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL AND 
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for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)’s guideline 
for human subjects research also mentions that community consultation 
supplementary to individual consent is advisable when “[r]esearch in certain 
fields, such as epidemiology, genetics or sociology, may present risks to the 
interests of communities, societies, or racially or ethnically defined 
groups.”264 The UNAIDS/WHO’s guidance on biomedical HIV prevention 
trials also considers it essential to involve the community in every major 
stage of the research “in an early and sustained manner” through “a trans-
parent and meaningful participatory process.”265 Compared to group con-
sent, community consultation  has been generally accepted and incorporated 
into the existing biomedical research ethics framework. According to the 
NBAC report, there are two situations where federal regulations require 
community consultation beforehand—when research subjects are enrolled 
in circumstances of emergency and when research is carried out in Ameri-
can Indian communities.266 Besides federally required consultations,267
community consultation usually does not have a standard procedure. Com-
munity consultation could be implemented in the early stage of designing 
research protocols and developing informed consent; it could also take place 
in the post-research stage as a continuing dialogical mechanism to disclose 
risks and benefits, to seek community review of research results prior to re-
lease, and to consider participants’ voices regarding the use of samples and 
data.268
There are several purposes that community consultation is designed for. 
First, community consultation provides researchers with cultural insights 
and publicity through communication with the community.269 Communica-
tion helps researchers develop a culturally sensitive way to go about recruit-
ing and seeking informed consent. Researchers can also better identify risks 
POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IV, 30 (Apr. 2001), http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_
commissions/nbac_international.pdf.
264. COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, Commentary to Guideline 8 
(2002), http://cometc.unibuc.ro/reglementari/cioms.pdf.
265. UNAIDS/WHO, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BIOMEDICAL HIV PREVENTION 
TRIALS 2, 17 (2012) (Guidance Point 2), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_
asset/jc1399_ethical_considerations_en_0.pdf.
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267. An example is that according to the FDA regulation, when a research is considered 
to be emergent, the IRB may require community consultation and waive the investigator’s
obligation to seek individual subjects’ informed consent, see 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (a) (7) (i)
(1996).
268. Sharp & Foster, supra note 241, at 180-82.
269. Eric T. Juengst, Community Engagement in Genetic Research: The “Slow Code” of 
Research Ethics?, in POPULATIONS AND GENETICS: LEGAL AND SOCIO-ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 245, at 182.
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and benefits with more understanding of the community’s shared values.270
Second, community consultation increases researcher accountability. By 
providing an opportunity for community members to understand and debate 
about the research, community consultation serves as an additional layer of 
safeguards to participants and the community. 271
Compared to group consent as a measure to protect group autonomy, 
the focus of community consultation is to identify the culturally specific 
risks and potential benefits and preserve the special values and culture of a 
given population.272 Eric T. Juengst argues that community consultation has 
a pragmatic function beyond only operating to enhance the population’s
control over the ways in which its members are studied.273 The same criti-
cisms directed at group consent regarding the definition of a group and the 
reinforcement of current categorization are not as strongly made about 
community consultation, because the “group” or “community” does not 
have a defined role as a research subject does. Nevertheless, issues remain 
with regard to deciding how to define the community and who should be 
included in the dialogue. Increasingly internal diversity and geographical 
distribution of populations reveal that there are not necessarily shared values 
nor common risks posed to a particular group.274 Further, consultation has 
been criticized as a process of researchers teaching community members in-
stead of communicating with them.275 Consultation without teeth also gives 
the researchers unchecked discretion to decide what kinds of voices should 
be taken into consideration. Community consultation puts the community 
member in a passive and weak position, as community members do not 
have the power to participate in decision-making. That community consulta-
tion has been widely adopted in some areas of research. This can be ex-
plained in part by the fact that it poses no real challenge to the existing 
framework of research ethics. It merely adds a mechanism, with no manda-
tory outcomes, for researchers to take the community’s views into account.
B. Public Consultation
1. Public Engagement as an “Ethics Plus”
Approach: the UK Biobank
Public engagement could be seen as community consultation on a larger 
scale of community. The following examples of public consultation are 
mostly in the context of large population-based biobanks.
270. Id. at 187.
271. See PCSBI II, supra note 263, at 30.
272. Juengst, supra note 269, at 187.
273. Id. at 190.
274. Id. at 187; Sharp & Foster, supra note 242, 47-48.
275. See, e.g., Juengst, supra note 269, at 189.
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The UK Biobank is an example that incorporates public engagement in-
to its governance framework. The UK Biobank is a nationwide project col-
lecting information from 500,000 volunteers, aged between 45 and 69 years, 
as a resource for research into common multifactorial diseases that affect 
people in later life.276 Major founders are the independent medical research 
charity Wellcome Trust (WT), the Medical Research Council (MRC), and 
the Department of Health (DoH).277 Before the project was initiated, there 
had been a successful tradition in managing large-scale prospective health 
population studies with little contention over ethical acceptability, yet in the 
1990s a public mistrust towards science and medicine arose due to a failure 
of regulation regarding the mad cow crisis and genetically modified 
foods.278 In addition to the ethical requirements of the HTA and the Data 
Protection Act (DPA), the founders of the UK Biobank were aware of the 
necessity of gaining support from both participants and the population at 
large.279 In the planning stage in 2003, an Interim Advisory Group (IAG), 
composed of experts in ethics, philosophy, law, science, and social science 
as well as consumer representation, was appointed funders to produce the 
EGF.280 Before that, funders also held a series of workshops and consulta-
tions on aspects of the UK Biobank proposals, and the results were sent to 
the IAG to be discussed and considered in the process.281 With the advice of 
IAG and opinions gained through public consultation, the draft of the EGF 
was approved in 2006 and set standards to safeguard collected samples and 
data used only in scientifically and ethically approved research.282 The inde-
pendent EGC, formed in November 2004, was tasked with overseeing the 
UK Biobank and to monitor and report publicly on the conformity of the 
UK Biobank with the EGF.283 The EGC also intended to include a variety of 
perspectives, including community and consumer perspectives.284 A series 
of public meetings was held annually by the EGC between 2005 to 2009, 
with short presentations, question and answer sessions, and publicity by lo-
276. About UK Biobank, UK BIOBANK, https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/ 
(last updated Feb. 7, 2019).
277. Id.
278. Oonagh Corrigan & Alan Petersen, UK Biobank: Bioethics as a Technology of 
Governance, in BIOBANKS: GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2, at 
143, 143-44.
279. Id. at 144.
280. The Ethics and Governance Council, UK BIOBANK, https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/
the-ethics-and-governance-council/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.; UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL,
http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
284. Members, UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL,
https://egcukbiobank.org.uk/members.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
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cal media and the UK Biobank website.285 The EGF contains statements of 
the project’s commitments to actively engage shareholders as well as the 
society.286
Efforts in public engagement reveal funders’ awareness of insufficiency 
of compliance with regulatory requirements against a background of public 
mistrust. Graeme Laurie describes the UK Biobank’s bylaws as an “ethics 
plus” approach that goes beyond the standard laid out in UK law and inter-
national standards.287 Laurie indicates that the ethics+ approach resolves eth-
ical controversies. For instance, broad consent becomes less problematic 
because it is turned into an ongoing engagement by being articulated public-
ly in the EGF and monitored over time by the EGC.288 The ethics+ approach 
taken by the UK Biobank incorporates public engagement into a part of its 
governance framework.
Nevertheless, critics question whether public engagement has been used 
more so as a method to mitigate concerns against the biobank project than it 
has to take public opinion sincerely into consideration. Public consultation 
by the UK Biobank has been criticized for its top-down, narrowly-framed 
design geared toward deflecting public attention away from a set of con-
cerns and steering the public toward a stance of support.289 Fundamental 
questions such as the necessity of biobanks on a national scale, commercial 
involvement conflicting with public interests, or mechanisms of regulation 
and enforcement were not consulted in the early stage. Critics find that the 
assumption behind much public consultation views the public as composed 
of reactionaries—those who are ignorant and whose concerns and distrust 
are a kind of risk to be managed.290 There is also no public scrutiny of how 
results of public consultation have been seriously examined and what their 
impacts are.291 Moreover, there is no participant representation in UK Bi-
obank’s governing bodies, and neither do participants have any legal rights 
to be involved in governance after donations. The EGC itself has no power 
285. See MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL & WELLCOME TRUST, REVIEW OF THE UK
BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 8 (2010), https://egcukbiobank.org.uk/sites/
default/files/meetings/Review%20report.pdf.
286. UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK, supra note 77, at 3 (“UK 
Biobank will seek active engagement with participants, research users and society in general 
throughout the lifetime of the resource.”)
287. Graeme Laurie, The UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council: How Valuable is 
an “Ethics+” Approach to Governance? in NEW CHALLENGES FOR BIOBANKS: ETHICS, LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE 239, 239-40 (Kris Dierickx & Pascal Borry eds., 2009).
288. See id. at 243.
289. Kathryn G. Hunter & Graeme T. Laurie, Involving Public in Biobank Governance,
in THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES? 151, 154 (Heather 
Widdows & Caroline Mullen eds., 2009).
290. Corrigan & Petersen, supra note 278, at 152; Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at 
154.
291. Corrigan & Petersen, supra note 278, at 152; Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at 
154-55.
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of veto in matters of research use; that decision-making authority is held by 
the Board of Director (BoD).292 The UK Biobank’s public consultation has 
been roundly criticized for expecting the public to be a “passive public”
prepared to be convinced.293 Consultations with a passive public may serve 
as a smokescreen for “business as usual,” or the introduction of insidious 
forms of control, or practices favoring the interests of certain groups.294
The development of public consultation is also worth mentioning, with 
regards to the role of EGC. According to a report evaluating the perfor-
mance of the EGC made by an expert Review Panel in 2010, the problem of 
EGC public consultation is that it lacks clear policy to handle evidence or 
opinions from the public.295 However, both Review Panel report in 2010 and 
later in 2015 concluded it was not appropriate for the EGC to keep serving 
the task for external engagement or the advocacy role to the public; EGC 
should rather focus on its main function on monitoring the ethics of the pro-
ject.296 The report somehow resonated with critics by objecting to the lack of 
clear and effective mechanisms to consider public opinion and the tendency 
toward promotion rather than real consultation. Moreover, the Review Panel 
reports seemed to consider public consultation as a part of regular operation 
that executive bodies should be in charge.
2. Public Engagement Through Legislation
Similar to the UK, many other countries have faced the challenges of 
ethical concerns and public distrust of science and medicine when establish-
ing large-scale population biobanks. Specific legislation has been a common 
approach to deal with public concerns. Specific legislation is supposed to 
represent the consensus of the community regarding those ethical controver-
sies. Public engagement has played an important role in the legislative pro-
cess in some countries.
Legislation could be considered the result of great social consensus af-
ter public debates. For instance, the Icelandic HSD Act, passed by the par-
liament in 1998, authorized the creation of a centralized database that is 
considered to be the consensus of the people after extensive public de-
bates.297 The HSD Act and the Icelandic biobank were formed against the 
292. UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK, supra note 77, at 13.
293. See Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at 155.
294. Corrigan & Petersen, supra note 278, at 155.
295. MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL & WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 285, at 9.
296. Id. at 1-2; MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL & WELLCOME TRUST, REVIEW OF THE UK
BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL REPORT OF THE EXPERT REVIEW PANEL 7
(2015).
297. Margret Lilija Gudmundsdóttir & Salvor Nordal, Iceland, in THE ETHICS AND 
GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 75, at 
53, 53; Piia Tammpuu, Public Discourse on Human Genetic Databases, in THE ETHICS AND 
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background of a long history of carefully registered health information, the 
acknowledged homogeneity of the society, and the supportive attitude of the 
Icelandic public to the project.298 The Icelandic biobank’s ability to win pub-
lic support was attributed to the initiator’s successful adjustment to the local 
context, and the high reputation and trustworthy image of representative 
scientists who played an essential role in convincing the public.299 However, 
the public debate was a top-down process, in which the lay public was con-
vinced by experts. The legislation was the result of persuasion. Some com-
mentators disagree that the HSD Act represented community consent and 
say it was flawed because great quantitative public support does not equate 
“qualitative consent.”300
Legislation can be the result of bottom-up civic movements. The Tai-
wanese Human Biobank Management Act (HBMA) is an example of legis-
lation that was born under pressure brought by human rights groups and eth-
ical, legal and social implications (ELSI) scholars on Taiwan’s national 
biobank. The Taiwan Biobank is a large-scale population-based biobank 
project launched in 2005, which planned to gather more than 200,000 sam-
ples from healthy adults to build a database for research into the interaction 
among genes, life phenomena, disease mechanisms, and environmental fac-
tors.301 Meanwhile, human rights groups and ELSI scholars had raised ethi-
cal concerns over the project since the project’s planning stage. Their con-
cerns were fueled by several factors, including an increasing rights 
consciousness towards information privacy against government surveil-
lance, and the collection and convergence of personal information. Research 
scandals had occurred in hospitals and in rural and aboriginal villages where 
researchers collected samples deceptively without obtaining informed con-
sent.302 There was growing mistrust of commercial exploitation of human 
samples and data.303 Although an ethical/legal governance framework simi-
lar to the EGF of the UK Biobank was drafted in the planning stage,304 the 
project continued to face strong opposition when it planned to collect blood 
samples in 2009, as opponents decried the project as unethical and lacking 
GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC DATABASES: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 73, at 
73, 75.
298. Gudmundsdóttir & Nordal, supra note 295, at 53.
299. Tammpuu, supra note 297, at 74.
300. Id. at 75-76.
301. Chien-Te Fan et al., Taiwan Biobank: A Project Aiming to Aid Taiwan’s Transition 
into a Biomedical Island, 9 PHARMACOGENOMICS 235, 235-38 (2008).
302. See Hung-En Liu & Terence Hua Tai, Public Trust, Commercialisation, and Bene-
fit Sharing, in HUMAN GENETIC BIOBANKS IN ASIA: POLITICS OF TRUST AND SCIENTIFIC 
ADVANCEMENT 28, 31-33 (Margret Sleeboom-Faulkner ed., 2009).
303. Id. at 29.
304. See Fan et al., supra note 301, at 237.
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in social consensus. 305 Being confronted with strong objections on ethical, 
legal, and democratic fronts, the HBMA was passed in 2010 to address the 
absence of biobank regulation.306 Compared to a top-down approach to the 
regulation of life science and technology that favors economic benefits over 
ethics, something often associated with East Asian countries, the HBMA 
represents a turn in the direction of forming political consensus as the basis 
of biotechnology regulation.307
Nevertheless, the HBMA does not completely resolve human rights 
groups’ and ELSI scholars’ concerns about the Taiwan Biobank. The pas-
sage of the HBMA does not amount to community consent to the Taiwan 
Biobank in the way that the Icelandic HSD Act did. The HBMA is designed 
to regulate all biobanks, not to authorize the creation of the Taiwan Bi-
obank. The Taiwan Biobank project was formally licensed in 2012, fol-
lowed by the establishment of another private large-scale biobank.308 More-
over, the government plans to integrate the Taiwan Biobank with databases 
of the national healthcare system to establish a “morbid health cloud,”
which also raises strong privacy concerns.309 The HBMA was born by civic 
activism, yet it does not ensure the continuity of public engagement. Legis-
lation by itself may not further public engagement, as the HBMA does not 
include clauses regarding public involvement. The HBMA could even pro-
vide a foundation to justify the establishment of large-scale biobanks in the 
future.
Another noteworthy observation is the gap between human rights 
groups, ELSI groups, and the general lay public. It has been found that the 
general public has not been made quite aware of ethical problems surround-
ing the national biobanks, as surveys usually show a majority support for 
the Taiwan Biobank.310 The gap between advocates and the general public 
305. Jingyi Liu & Hongen Liu, [Taiwan’s Biological Data-
base is Deserted], CITIZENS’ F. TO WATCH TAIWAN BIOBANK: BLOG (MAY 7, 2009),
http://biobankforum.blogspot.com/2009/05/blog-post_06.html.
306. Chin-Yi Liu, The Biobank Act as a Route to Responsible Research: A First Step for 
Taiwan? 110 J. FORMOSAN MED. ASS’N 129, 129 (2011).
307. See JOSEPH WONG, BETTING ON BIOTECH: INNOVATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
ASIA’S DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 152-53 (2011).
308. See Qui Yizhen, [National Gene Database 
Surpassing Privacy Disputes],TAIWAN ASS’N FOR HUM. RTS. (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:13 AM), 
https://www.tahr.org.tw/node/1141.
309. Chin-Yi Liu, [Morbid Health Cloud will Overly Surveil 
the Citizens], APPLE DAILY (Sep. 20, 2013), http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/
article/headline/20130920/35307667/.
310. According to a survey by the Academic Sinica, in Taiwan in 2006 (which is the 
latest quantitative result among the public released surveys), more than 80% of respondents 
knew little or never heard about biobanks, but around 70-80% of respondents supported large-
scale biobank projects; however, when respondents were reminded of the privacy risk, more 
than 50% hesitated to donate their blood samples to the biobank project. See GENETIC 
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raises the question of whether this seemingly bottom-up model really 
amounts to a robust civil society.
3. Public Engagement by Mini-Publics
A team at the W. Maurice Center for Applied Ethics at the University of 
British Columbia (UBC) has experimented with different ways of public 
engagement in a Genome Canada and Genome BC311-sponsored research 
project.312 The UBC team conducted a study of deliberative democracy to 
assess whether public engagement could go beyond collecting raw public 
perceptions to involving participants in deliberation based on sufficient in-
formation and diverse views.313 The team recruited a small group of demo-
graphically stratified participants by randomly contacting households in five 
health regions in British Columbia.314 Twenty-one participants participated 
fully in the deliberative event known as the “BC Biobank Deliberation” in 
April and May 2007.315 The event was divided into two weekends. Partici-
pants received a booklet of introduction on biobanking in advance.316 The 
first weekend was to provide background information and develop the con-
text of communication.317 Participants first listened to presentations by ex-
perts and stakeholders regarding science practices, ethical issues, and com-
mercial benefits and then began to discuss.318 Participants were divided into 
three small groups to identify their hopes and concerns regarding biobanks 
RESEARCH AND PUBLIC OPINION: SURVEY INTERVIEW AND DATABASE IN TAIWAN (III) 8, 
26-27 (2006), https://srda.sinica.edu.tw/datasearch_detail.php?id=879.
311. Genome Canada is an organization sponsored by the Canadian government that 
invests in genomic research and helps commercialization of research results. See About,
GENOMECANADA, http://www.genomecanada.ca/en/about/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). Ge-
nome BritishColumbia (BC) is a non-profit organization sponsored by the BC Province gov-
ernment and the Canadian government. The main purpose is to develop a platform for ge-
nomic research that will bring benefits to the BC community, Who We Are, GENOME 
BRITISHCOLUMBIA, http://www.genomebc.ca/about/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
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285, 286 (2008). See generally K.C. O’Doherty & M.M. Burgess, Engaging the Public on 
Biobanks: Outcomes of the BC Biobank Deliberation, 12 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 203, 203-
15 (2009); David M. Secko et al., Informed Consent in Biobank Research: A Deliberative Ap-
proach to the Debate, 68 SOC. SOCI. & MED. 781, 781-89 (2009); Heather L. Walmsley, Mad 
Scientists Bend the Frame of Biobank Governance in British Columbia, 5 J. PUB.
DELIBERATION 1, 7-22 (2009); Heather L. Walmsley, Stock Options, Tax Credits or Employ-
ment Contracts Please! The Value of Deliberative Public Disagreement about Human Tissue 
Donation, 73 SOC. SOCI. & MED. 209, 209-15 (2011) for other descriptions of this experi-
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and then presented their discussion results to the large group.319 The focus of 
the second weekend was the design of a BC biobank.320 Participants engaged 
in both small- and large-group discussions to identify agreements and per-
sistent disagreements.321 The BC deliberation is what deliberative democrats 
called a mini-public—a microcosm of citizens recruited to discuss compli-
cated and contentious political issues.322 Such a deliberative event is de-
signed to catalyze discussion among uninterested citizens by providing them 
with background knowledge and exposing them to different perspectives. 
Through this process, citizens are invited to reflect on the issue and change 
their initial preferences in light of deliberation.
The design of the deliberation was intended to respond to many of the 
criticisms leveled at the public consultation done by the UK Biobank: chief-
ly, that it was a method to steer the public toward acceptance rather than to 
involve the community in honest communication. The BC Biobank Deliber-
ation was conducted by an organization independent of any institution 
committed to the establishment of or investment in biobanking.323 The de-
liberation preserved the option of “no biobank” for participants and was 
open to challenging the assumptions set by organizers.324 Participants de-
fined issues that they believed to be relevant in the first weekend, being free 
from issues narrowly framed by organizers. Their task was to explore broad-
ly and express their hopes and concerns about a biobank in BC.325 Organiz-
ers also worked carefully to avoid the trap of a “captured voice,” whereby 
participants are unduly influenced by overexposure to certain perspec-
tives.326 Strict time limits were observed in presentations of background 
knowledge by experts and stakeholders on the very first day, and through 
the remaining days, participants did not directly contact these speakers.327
The results of deliberation showed that participants’ opinions remained di-
vergent despite certain changes from their initial positions.328 This gives ev-
idence that participants were not captured.
However, while the mini-publics model has the advantage of staging in-
formed public debates and giving voice to ordinary, varied citizens, the
question of its impact on policy remains unclear. The conclusions of the BC 
Deliberation recognized that their own opinions cannot be truly representa-
319. Id. at 290-93.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 291-92.
322. JOHN S. DRYZEK, FOUNDATIONS AND FRONTIERS OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
155 (2010).
323. O’Doherty & Burgess, supra note 312, at 204.
324. Id; Walmsley, Mad Scientists Bend the Frame of Biobank Governance in British 
Columbia, supra note 312, at 11.
325. O’Doherty & Burgess, supra note 312, at 212-13.
326. Burgess et al., supra note 312, at 287, 289.
327. Id. at 287, 289.
328. Id. at 294.
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tive of the whole BC population, but their deliberative engagement may 
contribute to trustworthy governance.329 The UBC team also said they would 
help transfer the results of the deliberation into policies, and a final report 
was sent to several federal agencies.330 The result of the Deliberation served 
as a frame of reference for policy-makers without having a binding effect, 
but it was decided that it should be seriously considered given its legitimacy 
born of civic deliberation. Observers also find deliberative engagement is 
supplementary to informed consent, as it helps individual participants con-
sider and reflect on broader interests than just their own.331 Deliberative en-
gagement can also contribute to political legitimacy, as there are decreased 
concerns about future use and the right to withdraw after deliberation has 
taken place.332
The BC experiment was not a completely new idea, as experiments like 
mini-publics have been used in other situations. But conducting a mini-
public for biobanking may be a somewhat less obvious application of the 
model, probably because the relationship between participants and a bi-
obank is regarded as a contractual relationship rather than a form of govern-
ance or public policy that requires public deliberation. However, the ques-
tion of whether the relationship of a biobank to participants should be 
simply defined as contractual irrespective of its political implications is a 
question that should remain open and be explored.
The BC Deliberation is also unique for its efforts to define limits for 
and minimize the influence of organizers in order to preserve the authentici-
ty of civic deliberation. Its results reveal the ability of lay citizens to under-
stand and reflect on complex issues, and to participate in forming policies. 
For instance, participants were found to be very creative, for example gen-
erating a sequence of policy alternatives for benefit-sharing and feedback to 
donors.333
C. Representation in Governance: 
Shareholder and Stakeholder Models
A common problem of public consultation is how its results or conclu-
sions can be translated into formal recommendations and influence deci-
sion-making. Being aware of public consultation having “no teeth,” the 
shareholder model intends to empower participants through engaging their 
representation in the governing bodies of a biobank.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 293-94.
331. Secko et al., supra note 312, at 788.
332. Id. at 789.
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David E. Winickoff proposes a Charitable Trust Model as a third way to 
the address the controversies over whether genomic resources could be 
commodified or are inalienable.334 The UK Biobank was designed with the 
principle of “partnership” to alleviate public concerns about commercial ex-
ploitation, while keeping alive the potential for collaboration with indus-
try.335 Partnership is embodied by management structures for public fiduci-
aries, such as the UK Biobank’s commitment to accountability, the public’s
indirect representation through governmental representatives on the BoD, 
public consultation, and the EGC’s function to advise the BoD.336 However, 
the UK Biobank’s weakness in realizing partnership governance is that the 
BoD has broad discretion over the distribution of banked resources, but 
mechanisms to ensure the fiduciary duties of the BoD are absent.337
Winickoff’s solution is to let donors be represented in the governance 
of the biobank. Winickoff refers to non-profit corporate law as a supplement 
to the charitable trust nature of the UK Biobank, arguing that donors should 
be viewed as shareholders who are represented in corporate decision-
making.338 A concrete proposal to include shareholder representation is to 
constitute a Participants Association (PA).339 Potential donors would be in-
formed in the process of informed consent that a PA would be formed, and 
they could voluntarily sign on to join the PA.340 With a certain number of 
petitions, the PA will be formed and leaders will be chosen by PA members’
proxy votes.341 The PA leaders will fill a number of seats on EGC, the IRB, 
or even an additional Donor Approval Committee (DAC) to review research 
protocols.342 Winickoff regards shareholder representation as a commitment 
to procedural justice that outweighs short-term increased administrative 
costs.343
A revised version proposed by Kathryn G. Hunter and Graeme T. Lau-
rie is to involve stakeholders, a more inclusive idea than the shareholder 
model. These proponents of the stakeholder approach criticize the share-
holder model from two aspects. First, they argue that the shareholder model 
leads to donors’ self-interest, which is contrary to the UK Biobank’s aim to 
334. David E. Winickoff, Partnership in U.K. Biobank: A Third Way for Genomic Prop-
erty? 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 441(2007).
335. Id. at 443.
336. Id. at 444-45.
337. See id. at 448.
338. Id. at 451; David E. Winickoff, From Benefit Sharing to Power Sharing: Partner-
ship Governance in Population Genomics Research, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN 
BIOBANK GOVERNANCE, supra note 168, at 53, 60.
339. Winickoff, supra note 336, at 61.
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343. Winickoff, supra note 338, at 62-63.
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benefit the whole community or the society.344 Second, they argue that the 
shareholder model does not necessarily enhance public deliberation. Repre-
sentation could help provide reflections on a wide range of interests for de-
liberation, but in the shareholder model representation speaks on behalf of 
its own interests.345 Nor does the shareholder approach provide robust, in-
clusive, and transparent processes to facilitate deliberation.346 Donors’ repre-
sentation may also cause the problem of vocal minority—that is, the re-
placement of one vested interest by another more recent and influential 
group, while the voice of the general public remains unheard.347 On the con-
trary, a stakeholder approach would better fulfill the public-interest goal 
with its broader inclusion of stakeholders, such as potential participants, 
beneficiaries, and future generations.348
A pragmatic issue with the stakeholder approach is how to involve 
stakeholders. Laurie and Hunter examine the stakeholder participation strat-
egy, which attempts to involve stakeholders through granting them an active 
role in governance bodies.349 Yet this strategy is different from the share-
holder model in that the representation is drawn from a wider constituency 
and is recruited rather than self-selected.350 Laurie and Hunter find the strat-
egy of self-selection unsatisfying because there is no realistic mechanism to 
assure adequacy of representation.351 They instead endorse a stakeholder in-
volvement strategy, which envisions partnership between management and 
stakeholders by organizational commitments to direct and ongoing dia-
logues with multiple stakeholders as well as to respond and adapt their con-
cerns.352 Laurie and Hunter consider the EGC and the EGF’s commitments 
to active engagement and public interests to be the basis of this ongoing dia-
logue, and they further underscore transparent procedures and the justifica-
tion of decisions with reasons to be criteria of this dialogue.353 To sum up, 
the stakeholder approach not only seeks greater constituencies but also a 
better quality of discussion to fulfill the criteria of deliberation. It may be 
imagined that identifying stakeholders and their representatives could be 
practically difficult and controversial, but Laurie and Hunter do not provide 
a concrete mechanism for identification. Their implicit solution by appeal-
ing to reason-giving resonates with what many deliberative democrats be-
344. Hunter & Laurie, supra note 289, at 164.
345. See id. at 165-66.
346. Id. at 158-59.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 176.
349. Id. at 172.
350. Id. at 172-73.
351. Id. at 173 (quoting Norman Daniels and James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability 
in Managed Care Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 50, 61).
352. Id. at 174, 176.
353. Id. at 175.
294 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:239
lieve: decision-making with justifiable reasons could complement the ques-
tion of representativeness of the decision-making body.
Both the shareholder and the stakeholder approaches have what consul-
tation lacks—involving participants or the general public in governing bod-
ies through representation. This perspective originates from the assumption 
of control over samples and data by recognizing that participants have cer-
tain proprietary interests. However, a transformation from proprietary inter-
ests to citizenship can be seen. Winickoff in his proposal of the shareholder 
approach indicates that his approach aims toward power-sharing, which is 
the premise of fair benefit-sharing.354 The stakeholder approach with a 
broadened constituency and deliberative procedural requirements further 
proves that the relationship between participants and biobanks is better ad-
dressed within a framework of citizenship and governance than cast in terms 
of proprietary interest and contracts.
D. Patient-Centered Initiatives (PCIs)
The PCI is an initiative to empower patients/participants by establishing
patient-centered biobanks. The most significant example is the PXE Interna-
tional, which is a patient-run biobank established by a group of people af-
fected with pseudoxanthoma elasticum to drive research for their treat-
ment.355 Another well-known example of PCI is Genetic Alliance BioBank, 
an initiative that creates a patient-centered research network where biobanks 
are encouraged to operate by the principle of community governance—i.e., 
participants control their samples and data by making decisions on the use 
of research rather than passively consenting to opt in to a database.356
There are also other programs adopting the patient-generated model of 
database. A program called “That’s My Data!” helps patients contribute 
their genomic data to researchers in exchange for open access to research 
results using these data.357 This program is part of the citizen scientist 
movements, which challenges the traditional approach of scientific research 
as a professionals’ domain by encouraging citizens to participate in doing
science.358 There is also a mechanism implemented by “Consent to Re-
search” in which participants can attach consent to their donated data and 
researchers who are willing to accommodate the consent can use the data.359
354. Winickoff, supra note 334, at 54-59.
355. Greg Biggers & Leonard D’Avolio, Address from the May 17 Meeting of the Pres-
idential Comm’n for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Session 7 (May 17, 2012) (transcript 
available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/meeting-9).
356. Id.
357. Amy Dockser Marus, Citizen Scientists Take on the Health Establishment, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052970204621904577014330551132036.
358. Id.
359. PCSBI I, supra note 40, at 90.
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A similar mechanism can be found in the proposal of a “walking biobank,”
that is, a biobank serves a network connecting participants, while partici-
pants are deemed as storage units of their own genomic materials.360 Re-
searchers, when proposing a research in need of biospecimens and data, in-
vite participants to “walk in” to donate their materials for specific 
research.361 The rise of PCIs can be attributed to the growth of information 
technology: PCIs usually avail themselves of web portal accounts and social 
media to place participants in a position of interaction.362 The development 
of information technology makes it possible for participants to express their 
preferences that shape research in effective and economic ways.
The PCI approach has advantages in addressing legal and ethical con-
cerns regarding biobanks and biomedical research. The PCI approach 
strengthens and sustains public trust through participants’ involvement with 
an understanding of biobanks and research.363 Ethical concerns are likely to 
be reduced because of transparency and oversight by direct participation.364
There would also be less need of anonymity because participants can be di-
rectly approached to seek consent for new research.365 Recruitment would be 
more efficient and participants would tend to remain in the program.366 Ad-
vocates of PCIs seemingly believe that control by participants would miti-
gate ethical controversies and build trust in scientific research. They also 
tend to recognize that involving lay perspectives produces better science by 
bringing professional authority in contact with social values.
However, there are challenges to PCIs. A major question is the quality 
of data collected by the PCI approach. Patients usually collect and contrib-
ute data when they feel motivated to and when they feel it right, but the col-
lected data may not be large enough to yield statistically reliable results or 
be representative of the whole population; plus, the opt-out option may hin-
der research.367 A more fundamental issue is whether untrained citizens can 
participate in doing science, as patients’ interests and their choice of what 
data to contribute may not coincide with what scientists consider relevant.368
However, the clash does not prove that amateurs cannot contribute to sci-
ence. Instead, it reveals that patients would present priorities different from 
360. Chalmers et al., supra note 4, at 10.
361. Id.
362. Jane Kaye et al., From Patients to Partners: Participant-Centric Initiatives in Bio-
medical Research, 13 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 371, 371 (2012).
363. See id. at 371.
364. Id. at 373.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Marus, supra note 357. However, advocates believe that patient-controlled data is 
of better quality because it would involve less error information. See Kaye et al., supra note 
362, at 375.
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those of scientific professionals, prioritizing what may have been ranked 
low in the hierarchies of scientists, their institutions, and their funders.
The PCI approach provides a different perspective to describe the rela-
tionship between participants and researchers. The Genetic Alliance calls 
patients the people, as they consider the patient’s role to move from partici-
pant to collaborator.369 PCIs have been advocated for in the context of scien-
tific citizenship rather on the grounds of property rights, notwithstanding 
that the PCIs tend to result in a small-scale database for specific groups of 
interest rather than a large-scale population database for wide public benefit. 
The PCI approach addresses what the existing research ethical framework 
has hardly dealt with—the power asymmetry between lay participants and 
scientists. The PCI approach challenges scientists’ authority in the realm of 
scientific research by requiring power-sharing in both knowledge produc-
tion and the distribution of resources.
E. Summaries and Reponses to Critiques
Two points are worth noting with respect to the overview of various
models of public engagement. First, the focus shifts from consent to partici-
pation in governance. In the traditional ethical framework for protecting re-
search subjects or participants, consent is the main protective mechanism 
and governance is the concern of researchers. Many approaches to public 
engagement have sought to bolster broad consent by supplementing further 
consent such as group consent by the community or dynamic consent. How-
ever, consent cannot really be voluntary without sufficient information and 
discussion. Further, given the communal nature of biobanks, participants are 
interdependent, which requires them to join in collective decision-making. 
Public engagement in governance grants participants opportunities to be in-
volved in deliberation with other stakeholders and to influence collective 
decisions through which participants can realize their autonomy. By partici-
pating in governance, the general public is also more effectively empow-
ered. Participating in governance enhances a citizen’s understanding and 
capacity to make decisions. Citizens are also likely to gain stronger bargain-
ing power through unionizing peers or stakeholders in any governing body 
compared with when they give consent individually.
Second, the scope of public engagement seems to extend beyond a bi-
obank to stakeholders or citizens in the community or the nation at large. 
Earlier approaches to public engagement such as group consent or commu-
nity consultation have faced the problem of determining who should be in-
volved. Despite the complexity of representation, an emerging consensus 
suggests that public engagement should not be limited to biobank partici-
369. The transcription of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
Meeting on May 17, 2012, in Washington, at 2-5, https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/
pcsbi/sites/default/files/Meeting%209%20Session%207.pdf.
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pants but should include other stakeholders. Even if a citizen does not opt in 
to a biobank project, her rights may nevertheless be affected as long as her 
personal information could possibly be used or identified through data-
mining, the interlinking of databases, or the shared human genome. Further, 
many large-scale biobank projects appeal to the public good, use public re-
sources, or financially rely on public investments. Citizens, as voters or tax-
payers, should be considered stakeholders with the right to be involved in 
the governance of biobanks.
Common critiques of public engagement are also worth mentioning. 
One critique is to question whether citizens are competent enough to partic-
ipate in deliberation, especially when research involving biobanks is usually 
related to complicated scientific facts. Another concern is that engagement 
would increase costs and become an obstacle to research. Still another cri-
tique is that public engagement would undermine the accountability of bi-
obank operators or researchers. Analyzing the experience of public engage-
ment in biobanking helps to respond to these criticisms.
Actual experiences with public engagement around the world have 
proven the competency of citizens. The BC Biobank Deliberation demon-
strated that lay citizens were competent to form guidelines for the design of 
a biobank, and were even capable of proposing new mechanisms of benefit-
sharing that had not been implemented by any biobank. A carefully de-
signed deliberative event for presenting various views and keeping topics 
open could prevent participants from being “captured” by the organizers or 
others. The biobanking legislation prompted by a civic movement in Taiwan 
demonstrated a bottom–up model of participation in forming ethical guide-
lines. PCIs also hold a positive attitude towards citizen participation in the 
process of producing scientific knowledge.
Another critique argues that public engagement would impose burdens 
on biobank operators or researchers that would hinder research. Difficulties 
associated with seeking re-consent would impede research, which is a main 
reason that the Final Rule did not adopt the NPRM’s proposal to extend the 
scope of human subjects research to research using nonidentified biospeci-
mens.370 However, similar concerns are not as strong for biobanks. Biobanks 
today are institutional databases with professional staffs that could help con-
tact participants or stakeholders, if necessary. Even if obtaining reconsent is 
necessary, it is the biobank operator, not individual researchers, who shall 
assume this duty.371 Approaches like PCIs that take advantage of infor-
mation technology also demonstrate the practicability of engaging individu-
al participants in continuing interaction with a biobank. Public engagement 
does take time and money. Nevertheless, the cost should be deemed a ne-
cessity given its potential benefits attendant to public trust and potential 
370. Berkowitz, supra note 14, at 956-57; Menikoff & Kaneshiro, supra note 16, at 613.
371. Miller, supra note 94, at 66.
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costs resulting from ethical and political queries. In addition, public en-
gagement is essential in terms of risk management; it helps risk evaluation 
and risk communication with the public, particularly with respect to the un-
certain and complicated risks of biobanking.
Public engagement does not undermine stewardship. By contrast, it 
strengthens oversight by requiring biobank operators and researchers to be 
accountable to the general public. For example, the EGC’s duty of publicity, 
including reporting to the public and advising generally on the interests of 
participants and the general public,372 demonstrated how public engagement 
by an oversight body strengthened the UK Biobank’s stewardship. The 
Taiwanese story also exemplified how public engagement strengthened 
oversight because the HBMA was born out of the pressure of a civic move-
ment demanding the establishment of a legal framework to regulate an area 
that had previously been self-regulated by scientific professionals.
VI. Conclusion
In the book Banking on the Body, the author Kara W. Swanson exam-
ined the metaphor of a body “bank,” which generated controversy over 
whether body products should be considered commodities or gifts.373 Body 
banks that were created by physicians for improving medical care originated 
on the basis of the “civic property” view that contended that even if body 
products were private property, they would be stored in banks in order to 
efficiently support medical treatments.374 The metaphor of banks later
adopted the “market property” view whereby body products were consid-
ered commodities that could and should be tradable in a free market.375 The 
title of Swanson’s book expressed the great potential for body products to 
benefit medicine and public welfare; such potential could be further bol-
stered through efficient exchanges facilitated by body banks. Similar to 
body banks, biobanking provides a mechanism for maximizing the utility of 
biospecimens and data. However, considering that the success of biobanks 
depends on public support and that its legitimacy is based on its contribution 
to public good, this article argues for banking on the people in the context of 
biobanking. Any sustainable biobank requires the involvement of the peo-
ple, not simply as donors, as active stakeholders participating in collective 
decision-making.
This article examined why and how public engagement is relevant in 
biobanking. Biobanks are not just a type of new scientific practice for ac-
372. Laurie, supra note 283, at 239-41.
373. KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, MILK,
AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 5-8 (2014).
374. Id. at 13.
375. Id. at 13-14.
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cumulating and consolidating resources for biomedical research: they have 
too many major and complicated socio-economic implications. Biobanking 
often contends that its objective is to promote the common good such as 
public health or economic development. Biobanks are expected to generate 
considerable economic benefits by serving as a platform for bringing bio-
specimens and data into commercial use. Biobanks could also serve as a 
strategy to create or reinforce community identities. Many biobank projects 
such as the PMI and its subproject, All of Us, appeal to genomic citizenship; 
that is, people have rights as well as responsibilities with respect to partici-
pating in scientific collaboration that could benefit the whole community.
Given that the current bioethical framework focuses on the protection of in-
dividual rights, it is not up to the task of addressing the many complicated 
issues involved in biobanks.
As this article has demonstrated, biobanking challenges the current reg-
ulatory and ethical framework, specifically in terms of informed-consent, 
privacy and confidentiality, and property and benefit-sharing. It is not coin-
cidental that public engagement is frequently proposed when discussing 
new solutions to these challenges. A participatory turn is evident in bi-
obanking, both ethically and normatively, and calls for public engagement 
have been made on the basis of ethical considerations associated with the 
communal features of biobanks. Normative developments, as expressed in 
the latest domestic and international guidelines, have also included mecha-
nisms for engaging the public in the governance of biobanks. Public en-
gagement initiatives have been introduced to formulate ethics as well as to 
involve the public in governance. These practices demonstrate that public 
engagement is not only feasible but also gradually becoming prevalent in 
the context of biobanking.
The ethical and legal challenges, as well as the participatory turn in bi-
obanking, also reveal the increasing relevance of citizen participation in bi-
oethics. In its first report, the PCSBI listed democratic deliberation as an 
emerging principle when considering the social implications of emerging 
technologies.376 The principle of democratic deliberation “reflects an ap-
proach to collaborative decision making that embraces respectful debate of 
opposing views and active participation by citizens.”377 Later in the final re-
port, PCSBI concludes that democratic deliberation should be used to guide 
bioethical policy decisions.378 The PCSBI recommended that policymakers 
376. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW 
DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2010), 
http://bioethics.gov/cms/synthetic-biology-report.
377. Id. at 5.
378. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, BIOETHICS FOR 
EVERY GENERATION: DELIBERATION AND EDUCATION IN HEALTH, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY 4-5 (2016), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/
PCSBI_Bioethics-Deliberation_0.pdf.
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and regulators at all levels should be guided by the principle of democratic 
deliberation when considering difficult bioethical issues and that stakehold-
ers should be involved in discussions that aim to promote mutual under-
standing and respect.379 The emerging bioethical principle proposed by the 
PCSBI echoes the participatory turn in biobanking described in this article.
Democratic deliberation as a guiding principle for addressing bioethical 
challenges as well as the regulatory and ethical debates concerning biobank-
ing, the wide variety of public engagement examples, and the rhetoric of 
many bank projects that has appealed to citizens all illustrate the importance 
of public engagement in biobanking.
379. Id.
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